Department of Political Science/Strategic Studies Program,

University of Calgary

The House of Commons Standing Committee has provided a detailed and nearly exhaustive examination of the problems and potential of circumpolar cooperation. The Committee's Report, specifically Chapter Four, is a rare consideration of Arctic security concerns in the current international system. The Committee focused primarily on the impact that the end of the Cold War has had on the nature of security in the Polar Region. The Report of the Committee argues that the nature of security concerns have been dramatically altered. The Report repeatedly makes the point that the nature of security has expanded from traditional notions of military issues to a much broader and expanded version of security, encompassing topics such as environmental security. As such, there is little to criticize this aspect of the Report. Rather, the Report should be commended for contributing to current discussions of Arctic security. For example, its discussion of the need to respond to the Russian Government's efforts to decommission its older, nuclear-powered submarine fleet raises several important points about Arctic security. The argument that the westerns states should be doing all that they can to assist the Russian efforts is a message that is well worth considering. After all, if NATO had been willing to spend billions to develop its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities to hunt down and destroy these submarines during the Cold War, it stands to reason that NATO should now be willing to spend millions to assist the Russians as they peacefully destroy large numbers of these vessels.

The arguments about the new nature of expanded security concerns in the Arctic notwithstanding, there remain some issues that the Report did not fully address that warrant consideration. The current effort to transform the security debate from a narrowly militaristic definition to a much broader definition is laudable. But in expanding the definition, it is still necessary to avoid the trap of examining only the "newer" elements of security while pretending the traditional elements are now irrelevant. This critique posits that the Standing Committee has indeed fallen into such a trap. The definition of security must include the traditional elements when at least one of two conditions exist in the Arctic region. The first is that a traditional military threat still exists. There is no doubt that the Cold War has greatly reduced the risk of conflict between Russia and NATO. But the questions remains as to whether or not the threat has been completely eliminated. The second condition is that there is a perceived military threat. Even if Russia has completely eliminated and repudiater-reactions of the Russians. In both instances, there are policies that Canadian policy-makers need to take that differ from those that would be necessary if all military threat and/or perceptions thereof in the Arctic regions had been completely eliminated.

Evidence of the first condition is minimal. There is little indication that either the Americans or Russians currently threaten each other. With respect to the second condition however, some recent Russian actions, including missile testing and the submarine procurement program, suggest that the Russian Government believes that some military threat to its security still exists.

With the end of the Cold War, the Russians no longer pre-aim their nuclear missiles at western targets. Furthermore, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties are substantially reducing the number of nuclear arms that both sides possess. However, in spite of the end of the Cold War, the Russian Government has been testing its missiles much closer to Western territory. Questions remain as to why the Russians believed it necessary to test launch one of their submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) 500 kilometres off the coast of Baffin Island in August of 1995. (1) Equally troubling is the apparent repudiation by the Russians of Brezhnev's pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons. Mary Fitzgerald, of the Hudson Institute, testified before the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development of the US House of Representatives that the official Russian military doctrine revoked the no-first use doctrine in 1993. She explained that the revocation was due to the growing gap between Russian and American military technology. As a result, the Russians believe that their increasing vulnerability requires a more "brutish" strategic doctrine. (2) Such a drastic policy realignment indicates that the Russians are continuing to view security in traditional terms.

Likewise, there is evidence that the Russians intend to continue developing more advanced nuclear ballistic missile submarines. The keel of the fourth-generation strategic missile submarine, the Yuri Dolgoruky (Borei class), was laid on November 2, 1996. (3) This new class of submarines is to replace the Russian Typhoon and Delta classes and is expected to be operational by 2002-2003. It is estimated that cost of each of these submarines will exceed $1 billion (US). This clearly illustrates the seriousness of the Russian's perceived military threat. Given the fact that Murmansk is one of three remaining SSBN ports, the construction of these vessels guarantees that the Arctic will remain an area of continued military activity for Russia, and therefore the United States, well into the 21st century.

The potential for an accidental nuclear war remains as a threat to the Arctic regions. On January 25, 1995 Boris Yeltsin activated his "nuclear briefcase" when Russian radar detected a rocket launch from somewhere off the Norwegian coast. The rocket was first thought to be headed towards Moscow, but eventually veered away from Russian territory. The rocket was in fact an American scientific probe sent to examine the northern lights. The Norwegians had informed the Russians of the launch, but mis-communications had resulted in the failure of the message to reach the proper Russian officials. (4) This incident, while hopefully rare, indicates that the potential for nuclear misunderstanding remains as real as ever.

In addition to the Russian Government's perception of a military threat posed by the United States, as evidenced by the continuing weapons programme in Russia and the continued threat of accidental nuclear war, some American policy-makers are perceiving an increased military threat from Russia. In particular, they are questioning the assistance provided to the Russians for the purpose of decommissioning their older nuclear submarines. (5) They are concerned that such programmes are subsidizing the Russian modernization of their submarine fleets. However, the current administration does not share this point of view. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that the American leadership is bound to be disturbed if, on the one hand, the Russians continue to plead poverty when decommissioning their older submarines while, on the other hand, they continue to build the Borei class.

The Americans have also demonstrated with their recent actions that they have every intention of pursuing Arctic security issues on a multilateral basis, but only of their choosing. As the Standing Committee Report correctly points out, the Americans refused to join the Arctic Council unless it was specifically precluded from addressing issues of security. Accordingly, a footnote was included in the Council's declaration which stated "The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security." Such a requirement would seem to indicate that the Americans do not want to take any action that might hinder their ability to define security issues in the Arctic. However, at the same time that they were insisting that the Arctic Council not deal with security issues, they were signing another agreement with the Russians and the Norwegian to do precisely that. The Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) calls for the three partners to work together to address environmental issues caused by military activity. (6) The agreement provides that six projects will be conducted to transport and clean up radioactive and non-radioactive pollutants from military sites. While such a move is laudable, it is not clear as to why the United States would agree to undertake such actions under the AMEC but not under the Arctic Council. It would appear that the Americans have a specific agenda that they wish to follow, but it is not clear as to what this may be. The objectives of the

American Government are particularly confusing given that the Arctic Council Declaration was signed on September 19, 1996 while the AMEC was signed on September 9, 1996. (7) Speculating as to the motives of the American Government, the most logical explanation is that the three partners of the AMEC did not want the other five members and three permanent participants of the Arctic Council involved in the process. Why this would be the case is currently unknown.

The questions that arise is what these factors may have to do with Canadian security issues in the Arctic and why the Standing Committee should be concerned. Two main issues need to be addressed. First, these factors demonstrate that the Canadian Government still needs to be wary about military security issues. As much as the end of the Cold War has reduced these threats, they have not been completely eliminated. The development of a new class of Russian ballistic missile submarines, entailing the provision of scarce resources to an expensive project, demonstrates the Russians current belief in nuclear deterrence despite the end of the Cold War. Many of these submarines will inevitably be stationed in the Northern base of Murmansk upon completion.

Secondly, even if the Russian actions do not pose a real threat to Canada, there is cause for concern if the Americans perceive these actions as a threat. The warnings of Professor Nils Orvik, formerly of Queens University, need to be recalled when he wrote about the "Defence against help". (8) Canadians may decide that there no longer are military threats in the Arctic, but if the Americans do not share this view, then Canada has to respond to American fears. Thus, it is important that a full appreciation of American northern security apprehensions be understood. A concern for Canada is the possibility that the Americans are beginning to worry about a reemerging Russian threat in the form of its nuclear force modernization. At this point, the anxiety of some American members of Congress are not shared by the U.S. Administration. But if this or any future administration begins to adopt such concerns, Canada will inevitably be involved. It is imperative that Canadian officials take a proactive position rather than simply being caught up in such a set of circumstances. What then can be done?

There are a number of options. First, Canada needs to promote a frank and open debate among the Arctic nations in order to determine what security issues remain as a source of problems. While it is much more politically acceptable to focus such a discussion on only environmental issues, it avoids dealing with the complete picture. Why is it necessary for Russia to build the Yuri Dolgoruky? If the belief is that such projects are necessary to protect Russian ship building capacity, can other less threatening project not be found? Why does the United States refuse to allow the Arctic Council to address military security, even though it has signed another agreement with Norway and Russia to deal with such issues? What can be done to eliminate American concerns about Russian submarine building programmes? While answers to these questions are not immediately apparent, solutions can only be attained through discussion.

Another option is that Canada take the lead in developing additional safeguards against the dangers of accidental nuclear war in the Arctic. Hopefully the Russian reaction to the 1995 rocket launch is a single abberation. However, only one such abberation is necessary for massive destruction where nuclear weapons are concerned. If the Arctic Council is not allowed to deal with such issues, other mechanisms need to be put in place. A central registry for all missile launches, open to public scrutiny, would serve as both a central coordinating function as well as a confidence building mechanism.

Furthermore, consideration should also be given to Canadian policy if tensions should re-emerge in the North. To ignore such concerns in the hope that they will simply go away is not the optimal policy for Canada. Canada should do all that it can to promote improved cooperation and peaceful cooperation, but options need to be available to restore relations in the event that they deteriorate among the Arctic states. At the very least, such options would provide Canada with a modicum of preparedness. Failing to do so will simply repeat past practices in which American perceptions of the threat dictate Canadian northern security concerns.

In summary, there is no doubt that the Arctic is now a much safer place than it was during the Cold War. The authors of the Standing Committee Report are correct in focusing on the new and expanded definition of security in the Arctic regions with its emphasis on environmental security. However, in accepting an expanded definition of security, it is important to remember that traditional aspects of military security still need to be considered.

Notes

1. Bill Graham, Canada and the Circumpolar World: Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. p.86.

 2. Mary C. FitzGerald, Hudson Institute, Testimony to the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development Committee on National Security, United States House of Representatives, March 13, 1997, www.afpc.org/issues/waller2.htm, (November 30, 1997).

3. FAS Nuclear Forces Guide, "Russian and Soviet Nuclear Forces - 935 Borei", www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/slbm/935.htm, (November 26, 1997).

 4. Bruce G. Blair, Harold A. Feiveson and Frank N. von Hippel, "Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert," Scientific American 277:5 (November 1997), pp.75-76.

5. J. Michael Waller, American Foreign Policy Council, Testifying before the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development on National Security, United States House of Representatives, March 13 1997, www.afpc.org/issues/waller2.htm (November 30, 1997).

6. Graham, Canada and the Circumpolar World, p.92.

7. Norway, Ministry of Defence, "Declaration on Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation, www.norway.org/press/14.html, (December 1, 1997).

8. Nils Orvik, "Canadian Security and `Defence against help'", International Perspective (May/June 1983).