The legitimacy of Canada's claim in the High Arctic rests, in part, on a strong civilian and military presence. Meeting that condition has proved easier said than done.

 
A year has passed since the U.S. Coast Guard ice-breaker Polar Sea took a now-famous short cut through the Northwest Passage, touching off a storm of protest in this country and forcing Canadians to realize that Canada's sovereign claim over the waters of the arctic archipelago is contested by the United States and other maritime nations.

 As the Polar Sea negotiated the Passage, the Canadian government initially appeared uncertain how to respond. Caught between an agitated Canadian public and a resolute U.S. government, Ottawa attempted to defuse the controversy through symbolic gestures, such as putting Canadian "guests" on board the ice-breaker and issuing authorization for the voyage when none had been requested. However, when independent Canadian legal experts were almost unanimous in declaring those moves irrelevant, the government was left looking weak and indecisive.

 In September 1985, the government reversed its position and announced an assertive policy containing a number of concrete measures designed to defend and bolster Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. The announcement clarified Canada's position on the status of our arctic waters and demonstrated a resolve to meet future challenges by extending full legal jurisdiction over the arctic archipelago and by increasing Canadian military and surveillance capabilities. These measures were generally applauded by Ottawa's critics, although the failure of the government to acknowledge and rely upon the rights of the Inuit in arctic waters disappointed the actual residents of that region.

 The government moved quickly to implement the formal legal components of the new policy. However, last September's assurance that "this government is not about to concede that Canada cannot afford the Arctic" looks considerably less comforting one year later. Naval manoeuvres in the eastern Arctic scheduled for this year have been cancelled. The long-awaited Arctic Class 8 ice-breaker has yet to be approved and was not even included in the government spending estimates tabled in Parliament earlier this year.

 This issue of Northern Perspectives assesses Ottawa's handling of the sovereignty issue since the voyage of the Polar Sea and presents some new opinions on Canada's ability to enforce its jurisdiction over the High Arctic. Defence analysts and retired brigadier generals Clay Beattie and Keith Greenaway raise some deeply disturbing questions about the new North Warning System, and marine transportation expert Tom Pullen reports on Canada's lack of a necessary icebreaking capability. Lawyer Jeff Richstone examines the government's sovereignty policy for the Arctic as well as specific recommendations of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations.