". . . the contact zone between our advance based CF-18s and the intruders would most probably be the airspace over Mackenzie Delta in the western Arctic.

"I ask you, sir, and committee members: Is that situation tolerable? It is not tolerable to my constituents, but is it tolerable to Canadians? Are we expendable in the grand design? The question that begs and pleads for an answer is: Why has Canada apparently already offered up its western and high Arctic to a potential aggressor?

"I suppose there is a complementary question that might also be asked. The question is: How can Canada claim political sovereignty over lands for which it has already surrendered military sovereignty?

"The DEW Line is, and has been, a distant early warning system for the United States of America. While applauding the eventual takeover of the line by Canadians, I believe that the new improved North Warning System will still be a Distant Early Warning system for the American heartland only.... Will it assist Canada to defend the Northwest Passage? Will it defend our small communities situated in the Arctic Islands-in fact, the major part of our northern land mass? I think I can answer that question, and the answer is, no."

-The Honourable Tom Butters, MLA, Inuvik, statement to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Tuesday, 17 September 1985.¹

In January 1985, the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence published Canada's Territorial Air Defence, a valuable report documenting the results of a year-long inquiry that focused on one specific question: "What policy should Canada pursue toward current proposals to modernize North American air defences?"¹ In "open literature", the report presents many of the considerations that must be addressed if the North American Aerospace Defense System (NORAD) front and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) flank are to be secure against attack by Soviet air and submarine-launched cruise missiles. The report recognizes that existing systems are obsolete and that an improved transitional ground-based system for early warning of bomber and missile attack is required until proposed space-based systems are in operation around the turn of the century.

In assessing Canada's potential contribution to both transitional arrangements and space-based surveillance, the committee noted:

. . . if Canada does not seek a role at an early stage in defensive space surveillance of the continent either by developing a national military space surveillance programme within the framework of the NORAD association or by participating in U.S. space programmes-then the United States may decide to do entirely without Canadian cooperation in North American aerospace defence, thus developing a high degree of knowledge about air activity over Canadian territory that will not necessarily be made available to the Canadian authorities.²

 On 13 March 1985, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence Erik Nielsen informed the House of Commons that the government had approved an agreement with the United States under which the two countries would take part in a joint programme to modernize North American air defences.⁴ The text of the announcement included the following points:

• "The agreement provides for the establishment of a warning system around the perimeter of the North American Continent. . ."
• "In the North there will be a new and improved DEW Line... to be called the North Warning System . . ."
• "The new radars will permit Canadian Forces interceptors... CF18s . . . to identify and, if necessary, engage intruders on the perimeter. . . "
• "North Warning will enhance our sovereign ability to control access to Canadian airspace. . ."
• "Canadian sovereignty in our North will be strengthened and assured for the future."5

The claim that the NWS will allow for the identification and intercept of intruders "on the perimeter" is, in fact, not correct. Although radar coverage will be extended to northern Labrador, the general course of the NWS will be that of the old DEW Line at approximately 70° north latitude. The NWS will, of course, be more effective as a result of the installation of new radars and the incorporation of other technological improvements; however, acceptance of the DEW Line as the basis for the NWS means hanging 1980s technology on a 1950s strategic plan-a plan that was, at best, a compromise of logistical and technical considerations.

Overcoming Traditional Perceptions

 A reassessment of the situation leads to the conclusion that today's technology would be better applied to the current realities of Canadian sovereignty and geopolitics rather than to the perpetuation of an outmoded air defence strategy. It is obvious that certain traditional perceptions must be overcome before this can take place.

 One traditional perception is that of an East-West threat to NATO: Norway is identified as the alliance's northern flank, and lines of commitment, deployment, and reinforcement run from North America to Europe. However, such a perception fails to appreciate the polar perspective, in which the "northern rim" also falls under NATO's area of responsibility and influence. The failure to recognize northern Canada and the NORAD front as part of NATO's northern flank could be as serious a miscalculation as that which rendered the Maginot Line useless at the outset of the Second World War; in other words, the NATO front in Europe could be outflanked by an attack through the North.

 A second traditional perception derives from the widespread use of the Mercator projection, which tends to distort the relative size and position of northern regions (Map 1). In contrast, a polar projection makes it clear that the northern Yukon, the Beaufort Sea-Mackenzie Delta region, and the islands of the arctic archipelago are "on the rim" and, therefore, "in the front line". It is also clear that any line established south of the rim (such as the DEW Line) reduces NORAD's detection range, warning time, and reaction capability. When a single successful penetration of the early warning system can mean the destruction of a city or a defence installation, it is not difficult to rationalize the extension of radar surveillance to the "true perimeter" of northern Canada.

 Under the current proposal, the NWS will not extend ground-based radar coverage over the Northwest Passage and arctic archipelago (Map 2). Surveillance of the Canadian High Arctic will instead be carried out by costly and intermittent U.S. Air Force AWACS flights originating from bases in Alaska or Thule, Greenland.⁷ The situation is clearly prejudicial to Canada's claims to sovereignty. Although token Canadian representation might be permitted, or even encouraged, the net result would be to concede responsibility for surveillance over disputed waters to the United States.

The circumstances surrounding the 1985 voyage of the U.S. ice-breaker Polar Sea through the Northwest Passage indicate that pragmatic U.S. negotiators are not likely to introduce or support initiatives that will reinforce Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic, particularly if such initiatives are perceived as in any way detrimental to U.S. interests in the region. Nevertheless, the case for an extension of radar coverage to the northern rim can be argued on the basis of the mutually beneficial increase in warning time that would be provided. Canada should pursue the forward deployment of defensive surveillance radar to the "true perimeter" of its territory by establishing bases at Mould Bay, Isachsen, and Alert (Map 3). This would be a modest, but logical, step toward possible future participation in a joint Canadian U.S. aerospace defence system or, alternatively, establishment of a totally Canadian controlled system.

 Battleground in the Arctic

 There is one further consideration in planning air defences that should not be ignored. Having accepted the concept of NORAD and the immediate need to implement the NWS, it is important to review the ramifications of deployment patterns. Given that the system is designed primarily for the protection of U.S.-based nuclear deterrent forces, what are the probable consequences of a nuclear attack for Canada? Based on the fact that NORAD forces would not be able to respond until the parent bomber or missiles enter the coverage zone of the surveillance radars, destruction of those aircraft and missiles would take place within Canadian territory, somewhere south of the 70th parallel and over the heads of many Canadians.⁸ This raises a number of questions that go beyond the basic issue of sovereignty:

• Will the nuclear warheads be armed prior to being released from aircraft or launched from submarines, or will they be armed in flight?
• Will the warheads be destroyed when the missile or aircraft has been shot down, or will impact produce nuclear explosions on Canadian territory?
• Based on the intended deployment of the NWS, has a general or probable missile impact zone been identified?
• Would the subsequent radioactive fallout pattern or "footprint" be similar to that which attended the crash of the Soviet satellite Cosmos 954 in the Canadian Arctic in January 1978? Or would it be worse, and, if so, by how much?

In planning for the defence of Canada within NORAD and NATO, it is clear that the temptation to cling slavishly to the compromises of the past must be avoided, no matter how economically attractive such thinking might appear. A 30-year-old strategy will only prove illusory, and Canada could, before long, find itself saddled with an upgraded, but equally inadequate, air defence system. However, by relocating the NWS on the "true perimeter" of the country, Canada would have the opportunity to harmonize its geopolitical aspirations with the optimum exploitation of modern technology. To ignore this strategic option would be to offer up the sovereignty and security of Canada's High Arctic.

B. Gen. (Ret'd.) C.E. Beattie was Commander of the Northern Region from 1978 to 1980. As a private consultant, he served as advisor to the Town of Inuvik during hearings before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

B. Gen. (Ret'd.) K.R. Greenaway is an internationally recognized authority on aerial navigation with extensive experience in the Canadian Arctic.

Endnotes

1. Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence, Canada' s Territorial Air Defence ( Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa 1985).

2. Ibid. p. 34.

3. Ibid. p. 20.

4. The Honourable Erik Nielsen, Statement on Motions on Air Defence Modernization, March 1985.

5. Ibid. pp. 1-8. (Emphasis added.)

 6. Government of Canada, `"Memorandum of Understanding in the Modernization of the North American Defence System", 18 March 1985, p. 6.

7. Canada's Air Defence p. 20. AWACS aircraft cost some S200 million each to procure and between $10,000 and $25 000 per hour to operate. Therefore, it would be extremely expensive to use them for continuous peacetime coverage. Furthermore, the arrangement suggested in the committee report (a one-third share in three NORAD AWACS aircraft) would provide, at best only minimal surveillance coverage.

 8. Canada, House of Commons "Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee of External Affairs and National Defence, issue no. 28` Tuesday' 17 September 1985, pp. 28:32-36.