The following is excerpted from Independence and Internationalism, chapter 10, "A Northern Dimension for Canada's Foreign Policy", pp. 127-135.

The deficiencies in backing up Canada's claim to sovereignty were highlighted by last summer's voyage through the Northwest Passage by the Polar Sea, a U.S. coast guard ice- breaker. Whatever the motive-a challenge to Canada's claim to the Passage or, as U. S. authorities maintained, a quick and inexpensive way to get the Polar Sea from Greenland to Alaska-the U.S. government was careful not to make a request for permission to make the crossing and thereby imply in any way recognition of Canada's claim to the strait. Instead, the United States made clear that the voyage was without prejudice to the legal position of the other side.

 As in 1969, when the Manhattan sailed through the Passage, the voyage of the Polar Sea caused a rush of popular anxiety in Canada. Pressure built quickly, and on September 10, 1985, the government responded in a statement in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Clark announced a number of measures intended to strengthen Canada's claim, including notification that Canada was drawing straight baselines around the arctic archipelago to delineate its claim, the removal of the 1970 reservation to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice,* increased aerial surveillance, naval activities in Canada's eastern arctic waters, and construction of a class 8 polar icebreaker. Taken together these measures have the potential significantly to strengthen Canada's claim to sovereignty over the waters of the arctic archipelago.

Although Canada's claim to sovereignty over the islands of the archipelago is beyond all doubt, the status of the Northwest Passage, which has both symbolic and defensive importance for Canada, is questioned by the United States. In view of recent strategic developments, which are described below, Canada should be able to control the movement of all classes of vessels through the waters between the arctic islands. The spontaneous popular reactions to the voyages of the Manhattan and the Polar Sea show that Canadians feel strongly about their claims to these waters.

 Between the two voyages by the U.S. ships, three other ships, the Polish Gdynia and the Swedish Lindblatt Explorer and World Explorer made full or partial transits of the Northwest Passage. In all cases permission was requested and granted. The Polar Sea did not ask permission, although Canadian authorities were informed of the U.S. coast guard's intentions, and the government of Canada ultimately agreed to the passage. The other superpower, the Soviet Union, anxious to establish international recognition of its claim that the Northeast Passage along its northern coast is internal waters, gave cautious support to Canada's claim.

 In its supporting brief to the committee, the Working Group of the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs suggested a three-step approach to resolving questions about Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage: first, an effort to achieve agreement with the United States; second, if this attempt failed, a joint approach with the United States to third-party arbitration; and, third, if the United States were to decline to be associated with such a step, unilateral action to secure a judicial settlement. During our hearings in Vancouver, we had an opportunity to review this advice at some length with Bruce McKinnon of the University of British Columbia.

 Professor McKinnon made a persuasive case that Canada should try to secure U.S. recognition of Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage in exchange for a right for U.S. vessels to go through the Passage. He pointed out that such an agreement, confirmed by treaty, would be binding only on the United States and Canada and would not obligate other countries. Nevertheless, McKinnon felt the approach was justified given that the only questioning of Canada's claim has come from the United States and given the ease and certainty of the outcome. Moreover, recognition of Canada's sovereignty over the Northwest Passage by the United States, a major sea power, would greatly strengthen Canada's claim internationally.

 Although Professor McKinnon thought a bilateral agreement was the best solution for Canada, he was doubtful that the United States could be persuaded to accept Canada's claim at this time.

 I think the U.S. government probably feels that it simply cannot afford, at least publicly, to give way on any one of these disputes involving a strait. It would set a bad precedent for all its other disputes. (51:1 1 1)

 Despite this pessimistic assessment, we recommend that the government of Canada renew its efforts to secure the agreement of the United States to Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage. Canada has some leverage. First, concluding an agreement [with] the United States would avoid the uncertainties involved in referring the matter to the International Court of Justice. Second, a resolution of the matter would allow the United States to send its ships through the Passage with no fear of damaging its good relations with Canada. A treaty would be a quick and tidy way of addressing the problem.

 In the event that the United States clearly rejected a new Canadian approach to recognize its claim through a bilateral agreement, should Canada then press quickly for third-party arbitration? Delay might work to Canada's advantage, so long as there is no new challenge. If there is, Canada would have to respond quickly, and we believe the best move in that event would be to insist on referring the question to the International Court of Justice. Several expert witnesses-law professors Pharand, Cohen and McKinnon-all thought Canada already had a reasonably strong case. Whatever the outcome, it would resolve a dispute that could otherwise do great damage to relations between Canada and the United States.

Given the difficult choices faced by the U.S. authorities in this matter, the committee surmises that the U.S. government may also see merit at this time in avoiding action that Canada could interpret as a challenge. Until there is a pressing need for a U.S. vessel to transit the Passage, on balance the United States loses least by waiting. If in future the need for a U.S. vessel to use the Passage was sufficiently great, the United States might even decide then that its best course was to ask Canada's permission. Such a step would, it is true, imply recognition of Canada's claim, but it would avoid the uncertainties associated with a reference to the Court.

 Accordingly, unless the United States agrees to recognize Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage by way of a bilateral treaty, the committee's preferred course of action at this time is a deliberate decision to allow time to pass rather than pressing for a decision by the International Court of Justice. In order that this issue not be allowed to

 damage relations between the two countries, however, we believe the government should be frank and open with the U.S. government and make clear the course of action it is following.

 *In response to the 1969 voyage of the Manhattan, Parliament passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, proclaiming a 100-mile pollution prevention zone in the area. This was an entirely new legal concept, and at the time the government decided that the new law might not stand up to a challenge in the International Court of Justice. To protect the new Canadian position, the government entered a reservation as to the competence of the Court. The removal of the reservation was made possible by developments in arctic environmental law achieved at the Law of the Sea Conference.