Mining the Popular Wisdom
Yukon 2000 brings a fresh approach to northern economic development
ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING IN Canada has long been preoccupied with the problem of regional disparity. That a variety of ills may be blamed on the inequitable distribution of social goods and economic opportunities is well known, yet the search for appropriate remedies has proved never-ending; from ARDA to DREE, from regional incentives to centres of growth, successes have been marginal and failures too often the norm.
Such centrally controlled, "top-down" approaches to economic direction can be criticized for many things, not the least of which is a tendency to overlook local needs and aspirations. But more puzzling and certainly more frustrating to those who live beyond the beneficent glow of the industrial "heartland" is government's seeming disregard for the quiet strength wrought by a history of hard times. Although Canadians in so-called "hinterland" regions may lack the luxury of an economic hedge-and suffer for it in times of recession-they have learned to fall back on more established, reliable means of community support, developing a resilience less appreciated and often non-existent in the urban metropole.
In part, this strength derives from the ability to step out of the wage economy and its attendant values, to reaffirm a sense of self-sufficiency that can offset the vagaries of a remote and unresponsive marketplace. Such is the basis for Yukon 2000, the Yukon government's much-talked-about experiment in economic planning which many feel may mark a breakthrough in the way regional development is viewed in Canada.
This issue of Northern Perspectives examines Yukon 2000 from several angles. In his overview article, public policy consultant Lindsay Staples describes the Yukon 2000 process and outlines the government's options in putting together an economic blueprint respectful of community needs. Ironically, government also represents a major sector of the Yukon economy, a fact that makes its co-ordinating role all the more important. University of Regina economist Doug McArthur offers some thoughts on the dilemma faced by the territorial government as it seeks to provide economic leadership and, at the same time, balance a range of very different-and sometimes opposing-interests.
Although widely praised as an innovative and democratic approach to planning, Yukon 2000 is not without its detractors.
The Yukon Chamber of Mines, for one, has dismissed the project as "a costly public relations exercise", an assessment echoed by Opposition critics in the legislative assembly. Whitehorse Star reporter Jim Butler, who has followed Yukon 2000 since its inception, highlights some of those concerns in his review of the exercise, and consultant Bob Green presents the view of Yukon Indians that economic planning of the sort envisioned in Yukon 2000 can only work if full recognition of a distinct native economy is incorporated into the ongoing process.
In many respects, Yukon 2000 is an important test for the territory's NDP government and for Government Leader Tony Penikett, who spoke with Northern Perspectives about the philosophy guiding the initiative and about related issues such as constitutional development, free trade, and energy exploration.
Although much hinges on the government's response and its ability to transform the concerns of Yukon residents into effective policy direction, the legacy of the Yukon 2000 approach seems secure; communities across Canada have looked to it as a model for development that brings individuals much closer to the decision making process than is possible in traditional central-planning approaches. As a strategy for community development in the
North, Yukon 2000 has been studied by the Government of the Northwest Territories; no doubt it will surface there in one form or another as legislators work to create _n economic planning model geared to local
Peter Boothroyd of the University of British Columbia notes that the Yukon 2000 process "got people thinking that they could indeed direct economic strategy, that the economy need not be something laid down by the invisible hand of the market or the heavy hand of technocrats". Michael Decter, currently studying the initiative for the Economic Council of Canada concurs with
The view that Yukon 2000 offers a new avenue for ideas, but warns that the high expectations it has created present a major challenge for implementation. CARC researcher Joseph Potvin, in a critical review of the strategy, suggests that although Yukon 2000 may be praised for directing attention to the non-wage and subsistence economies, its approach falls short in terms of practical application. Finally, Jean-Jacques Simard, of the Université Laval, contrasts the Yukon situation with that of northern Quebec, detailing some of the obstacles likely to be encountered in the application of a Yukon 2000 approach to other jurisdictions.
It would be wrong to portray Yukon 2000 as a panacea for the ills that
dog economic development in the Yukon a-nd in the North more generally;
yet the process-and, it is to be hoped, the government's response-demonstrate
that democratic planning can be made to work, that disparate interests
can be brought together to produce meaningful dialogue and innovative solutions
to common problems. For Yukoners, disparity and despair are not necessarily
coexistent.
The Process
In June 1986, 60 Yukoners across the territory gathered in the mining town of Faro to discuss the future of their economy. The site of the Yukon's largest private-sector employer and the most recent example of the vicious circle that has characterized the Yukon's economy since the discovery of gold on Bonanza Creek in 1896, Faro is a textbook example of Yukon economic history and of the thinking d at has guided much of the territory's development. From a high of 2300 residents in 1980, Faro's population had plummeted to a rock-bottom low of around 80 tough-minded individuals by the spring of 1985.
In many respects, the Faro experience is a classic collection of Yukon economic memorabilia. For industry, Faro is a harsh reminder of the vulnerability and fragility of a world-class Canadian ore producer to the roller-coaster fluctuations in international metal markets and increasing international competition. For small business, Faro is a reminder of its dependence on an industry whose fortunes hold sway over regional markets and consumer demand. For labour, it is a reminder that even the most lucrative of contracts offers no guarantee of long-term stability and security for company families. For government, it is a reminder of its excessive reliance on the private sector as the engine of economic development, and of its failure to imagine a more dynamic and vital role for the public sector as an actor in the Yukon economy. For municipal leaders, Faro is a reminded that rural Yukon has for too long been considered a natural resource and political hinterland to southern processors and territorial and federal governments. For the Yukon's Indian people, Faro is a reminder of limited wage labour opportunities and, alternatively, of the historic role of the subsistence economy as a buffer against the economic upheaval and social disturbances that are features of a boom-and-bust economy. For environmentalists, Faro is a reminder of repeated failures by regulatory agencies to better assess the benefits of development against the long-term impacts on fish and game, wildlife habitat, and water quality.
It was in this forum, mindful of these issues of public concern, that the Yukon government launched Yukon 2000-one of the most comprehensive regional economic planning exercises ever undertaken in northern Canada. Over the next 14 months, scores of meetings and workshops were convened throughout the territory, and Yukoners from all walks of life were consulted. Business people, workers, unions, hunters, trappers, fishermen, Indian organizations, volunteer groups, women's groups, local government officials, politicians, public servants, youth groups, and senior citizens all expressed a strong interest in the Yukon's economy.
In recognizing such abroad public interest, Yukon 2000 necessarily went beyond those producers and activities customarily appearing on the territorial balance sheet. It gave special attention to those areas and activities often regarded as marginally economic, or even non-economic. Through this approach, interest groups, professionals, and community people met often to discuss and report on the issues and options for development in a range of activities that included mining, tourism, forestry, hunting, trapping and fishing, manufacturing, construction and housing, trades and services, agriculture and food, non-wage work, and cultural industries. In addition, these workshop groups produced reports on five broader areas of economic interest to Yukoners: natural resource management, human resource development and training, financial resources, information gathering and transfer, and infrastructure development.
Historically, economic planning and decision making have often under-represented or ignored numerous groups in Yukon society. Yukon 2000 funded their participation and research to ensure stronger consideration of their interests in a development strategy. The Yukon Federation of Labour, the Yukon Association of Special Needs, and the Yukon Conservation Society were among those who contributed research papers; young people and women organized special conferences to discuss their participation in Yukon economic life.
Following the publication and distribution of background papers and reports, Yukon 2000 officials met with residents in each community to identify specific local concerns. The intent was to generate a regional development strategy reflective of varied local requirements and driven by community aspirations and plans.
In August 1987, the Yukon government released The Things That Matter: A Report of Yukoners' Views on the Future of Their Economy and Their Society. Two months later, in Dawson City, several hundred Yukoners met to review the report and discuss the challenges to be faced in seeing their suggestions and recommendations implemented.
Throughout the 2000 exercise, Yukoners did not limit their recommendations for action to government institutions but assigned responsibility to non-governmental and private-sector organizations as well. Many groups expressed a willingness to work co-operatively with one another in the future to further the implementation of the strategy and to assist in its adaptation to changing needs and circumstances.