A Study in Democratic Planning

 Peter Boothroyd

PLANNERS EVERYWHERE CAN learn a lot from the Yukon 2000 process. Here is a development planning process in which government is not attempting to divine the public interest and negotiate the inevitable trade-offs among competing geographic and sectoral interests. Rather, conflicts are to be identified and resolved through direct contact among the various parties: miners and conservationists, farmers and hunters, Indians and whites, employers and employees, the mainstream labour force and would-be workers, established businesses and aspiring entrepreneurs, and the urban centre and smaller communities.

 The advantage of a process like Yukon 2000, which encourages apparently competing interests to hammer out their differences directly, is that, if it works, it produces good plans-plans that are well-informed by all parties' knowledge, that creatively resolve conflicts, and that, as a result, are widely supported and politically viable. But politicians and planners who claim to speak for the public interest often doubt democratic planning will work. They fear that a process that tries to get opposing interests talking to one another will increase acrimony and polarization rather than mutual understanding and creative resolution. They worry that the process will "blow up" and that they'll be the ones held responsible for the mess.

 Certainly such trepidation was felt at all levels within the Yukon Territorial Government at various points throughout the process. Occasionally, during the series of conferences and community meetings, tensions did rise because of frustrations in communication, concern that the process wasn't getting anywhere, or suspicion that some group or another was being set up for public attack. At these times, it took courage, and a belief in people's good will and good sense, to maintain a democratic planning process that goes beyond the time honoured pattern of individual interest group lobbying and in-camera government arbitration.

 While maintaining its basic commitment to develop a proactive-and interactive-planning process, the government also attempted to be responsive to participants' concerns and suggestions regarding the form of the process. For example, conference formats were changed even as conferences were underway, the timing of the whole process was significantly extended, and the programme of community visits by Yukon 2000 staff was modified. In such ways, frustration and conflict-producing situations were dealt with before enmity could develop.

As people realized that their ideas were being taken seriously, Yukon 2000 began to gain credibility throughout the Yukon. Participants appreciated the opportunity to discuss problems and solutions with apparently opposing interests. And they respected the direct personal involvement of the government, from the leader down through the top levels of the bureaucracy. Far from splitting the Yukon apart, the process seemed to help integrate the territory by making people aware that they share common problems and a common destiny.

To a large degree, the process even seemed able to surmount the partisan politics associated with any government initiative in a party-based system. Even dyed-in-the-wool Tories spoke of the value of the Yukon 2000 process, and the NDP government managed to keep the process open to all elements, including the harshest Opposition critics.

 Still, partisanship cannot be avoided in our system, and this cast a pall over Yukon 2000. Opposition members, playing their prescribed role in the British parliamentary system, were continually looking for defects, and the government was constantly looking over its shoulder to see if political points would be scored when difficulties arose. In addition, the government was sensitive to the charge that it was using the process to avoid making tough decisions; it was also worried that the process would generate demands for decisions or services that it could not meet. Despite these anxieties, the government and the participants in the process transcended narrow political interests for the sake of developing an economic strategy based on consensus. The process became cordial rather than acrimonious.

 In large part, this constructive atmosphere was the result of careful planning and relatively plentiful resources. For example, the three major conferences, which brought together some 500 people from across the geographic and sectoral spectra of the Yukon, were organized so as to encourage interpersonal communication among both complementary and competing interests. Participants were organized into small, heterogeneous groups and assisted by facilitators to explore fundamental issues, consider all perspectives, and resolve conflicts. In some sessions, representatives of wholly diverse interests were able to debate, discuss, and ultimately agree on definitions and solutions in such difficult problems areas as resource management and affirmative action. People who had never before attempted to communicate with each other began talking.

 Not everything went smoothly in the conferences: some plenary sessions were too long or were dominated by panels and reports; some small group sessions were too short or were rigidly structured. But, at their best, the Yukon 2000 conferences produced sincerity rather than rhetoric, serious problem solving rather than game playing, shared responsibility rather than scapegoating, and listening as much as talking and selling.

The Yukon 2000 process confirms that democratic planning involves a degree of frustration, anxiety, and suspicion; but it also leads to a strengthened sense of community as people experience the joys of reasoning together, discovering unexpected areas of agreement, and synergistically producing new ideas.

 Concern for Fairness

There is a concern in democratic planning that the weak will get bowled over by the strong, that well-organized, well-funded interests will dominate the proceedings.

The Yukon 2000 experience shows that this need not occur if resources are dedicated to helping weaker groups present and, if necessary, formulate their own cases. In their participation and in the substance of resulting plans, these groups made significant gains. For example, the rights of Yukon Indians have received more general recognition than ever before; the potential contribution of the disabled and homemakers-often overlooked in economic development planning-was a major focus of the Yukon 2000 conferences and interest group meetings; and issues of importance to small, rural communities, such as financial services, were identified by Yukon 2000 staff.

 Another concern is that a democratic process will become a numbers game in which consumer interests gang up on producers, whose importance and problems they don't understand. Indeed, if there was any concern expressed about the fairness of the Yukon 2000 process, it seemed to arise from what is generally considered the strongest territorial interest: the mining industry. Representatives of the industry occasionally seemed uncomfortable about being called to account publicly for their positions.

However, such discomforts were few. There was little "miner bashing", and the process never degenerated into a witch-hunt. In part, this may be because many Yukoners still see their welfare as ultimately dependent on mining. But certainly it was also because the process engaged all interests, including miners and their critics, in direct personal confrontation in small groups. Grandstanding was discouraged.

One delicate area relating to fairness lay in the organization of the process and the writing of Yukon 2000 reports. These responsibilities were retained by the territorial government, presumably because it saw itself as the only true representative of the total public interest. Although the credibility of Yukon 2000 did not seem to be impaired by this, it might have been better to set up an independent governing body with its own secretariat to do the writing. This would have reduced confusion about the government's role and alleviated concerns about conflict of interest-an especially important consideration given that the government must, in some cases, choose among apparently incompatible recommendations.

Efficacy

A third concern about democratic planning is that the product of its attempt to reach consensus will be platitudinous mush rather than decisions that set clear directions for action. Again, the Yukon 2000 experience shows this need not happen.

The process began with a statement of four substantive goals: ensuring that Yukoners have the option to stay in the territory, taking control of the future. achieving an acceptable quality of life, and achieving equality. The report that summarized the conclusions of the process to September 1987, The Things That Matter, noted that the four original goals had received endorsement throughout the entire Yukon 2000 process. Within the context of these, more specific common concerns emerged: diversity and flexibility, self-reliance, a mix of economies, Indians in the economy, women in the economy, responsible use of resources, community development, and local participation. An example of the thoughtfulness that went into discussions on these concerns, and of the significance of the outcomes, is provided in the following passage on the diversity and flexibility theme in The Things That Matter.

 In en economy that has traditionally operated on a very narrow economic base, Yukon people have shown a high degree of job flexibility, especially during hard times....

This feature of our economy can be explained by our desire to remain in our communities and in the territory, even during periods of economic hardship. It also suggests, as many Yukoners have said again and again during Yukon 2000, that there is an underlying character to our economy that is often unrecognized, hidden in the shadow of mining and government. Many Yukoners are involved in more diverse economic activities than formal statistics suggest. Many of us work in small businesses, cottage industries, household production and subsistence activities for a few months at a time or throughout the year, demonstrating a high rate of movement in and out of the work force, as our economic circumstances or interests change. It means turning to occasional wage work to provide a necessary supply of cash for subsistence activities and then to hunting and fishing to reduce the need for wage employment.

Seasonal work spells of unemployment, a high rate of mobility in the work force-these are often viewed by southern Canadians as negative features of an economy and barriers to development. Yukoners hold a different view: occupational flexibility should allow us to remain in our communities when the attention of government and developers goes elsewhere. Far from being a barrier, this flexibility has often been a source of strength....

 In addition to sweeping policy directions, Yukon 2000 participants developed a number of concrete recommendations through conferences and workshops. Here is a sample from The Things That Matter:

• Open government training courses to volunteer groups when space is available.
• Provide researchers and scientists with a list of locally available suppliers, guides, transportation companies, and other services when they apply for research permits.
• Provide a more continuous supply of crops through adequate storage facilities.
• In co-operation with the Indian community, evaluate the feasibility of a school of Indian art.
• Stagger the closure dates for government tenders, and break large contracts into smaller ones.
• Pass legislation enabling the establishment of trust companies and credit unions in the Yukon.

Some recommendations developed early in the process seemed to enjoy wide support and have already been acted on by the Yukon government. For example, business loans have been expanded, a venture capital programme has been established, an applied technical programme for commercial research and development has been created, community development worker positions have been established in most Indian bands, and a study has been undertaken to cast more light on the significance of the subsistence and non-wage economies.

 Beyond developing policy directions and recommendations for government action, the Yukon 2000 process was effective in another way. It got people thinking that they could indeed direct economic strategy, that the economy need not be something laid down by the invisible hand of the market or the heavy hand of technocrats. It became increasingly evident that an economy is created by people and can be guided by people. The process helped move thinking away from the perennial question of what government should be doing to consideration of what people could be doing through other organizations. As The Things That Matter says:

...The process has moved from driving government policy and actions only, to examining broader directions for economic development which could be implemented by others concerned about development....Most Yukoners do not want government to be solely responsible for development policy. A healthy development strategy will outline and will support roles and activities for all-individuals, communities, industries, interest groups, employees. bands, and governments.

Measuring Efficiency

A number of observers have agreed that Yukon 2000 was cordial, fair, and effective. What concerns them is the efficiency of the process.

 There is no doubt that the process was expensive-some might say lavish: three large conferences, hundreds of community and interest group meetings, much government staff time, generous use of local and outside consultants, and innumerable hours of time put in voluntarily by the hundreds of participants.

 Was Yukon 2000 worth the cost? Should similar processes ever tee attempted elsewhere? The answer, though difficult to justify with hard indicators of efficiency, is "yes".

 Of course, the process could have been more efficient in some respects. But when one thinks of the thousands of expensive economic development reports that remain unused because the people who ultimately have to understand them, implement them, or support them were not involved in producing them, one has to believe that a participatory process such as Yukon 2000 is better value for the money. At the very least, it has increased understanding of the particular nature of the Yukon economy, produced agreement on broad orientations for development, and encouraged people to think about how many different levels of society-besides government and individual business-contribute to the economy's production and direction.

Substantively, Yukon's back-to-basics approach promises to offer better value than the megaproject planning that has led to such financially expensive economic development fiascos as the Bricklin auto plant in New Brunswick, the Come By Chance oil refinery in Newfoundland, and the Northeast coal-mining operation in British Columbia, or such socially expensive ventures as have issued from the boom-and-bust oil and gas industry in the Northwest Territories and north-east Alberta.

 Yukon 2000's basic approach reflects the society-wide megaproject disillusionment of the mid 1980s. But it also reflects the fact that the process has tapped and combined the knowledge, ideas, and visions not only of big employers and grand planners but also of the many small and often uncounted producers-homemakers, hunters, artists, gardeners, and guides. Together, they have transformed the disillusionment with megaprojects into an optimistic, practical strategy that favours stability through diversity and adaptability over specialized boom towns; a balanced quality of life over financial wealth; equity over rapacity; and local control over dependence on outside owners, suppliers, or welfare.

The cost of developing this strategy is a relative pittance. It may turn out to be the most efficient economic development planning process ever undertaken in this country.

Peter Boothroyd is Adjunct Professor, School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia.