Prospects for Soviet-Canadian Co-operation in the Development of Northern Regions

Arkadi Cherkasov

This may sound absurd, but today, as glasnost and democracy continue to spread throughout Soviet society, it has become particularly difficult for a Soviet specialist to address a foreign audience on international subjects.

One of the reasons for this is the unusual concurrence of sharp (and therefore all the more fruitful) polemic, clashes of opinion, and pluralism of ideas in Soviet science, and a certain mental sloth and persistent stereotyping in the perception of the U.S.S.R. by the West.

 Proceeding from these stereotypes, some might assume that a Soviet author will a priori uphold the superiority of Soviet methods of development in the North over those which prevail abroad. If they turn to the recent Soviet press, however, they will see the sharp criticism that is voiced in the country today about past mistakes end miscalculations in the development of the Soviet northern territories. These include the lack of co-ordination between the actions of different ministries and departments (which sometimes strongly resemble the actions of certain private companies in the Canadian North), the impossibly large scope of some of the economic projects undertaken, and inadequate attention to many aspects of environmental protection and to the development of cultural and utility services-even basic conveniences-for the people living in the North.

 But then the study of foreign experience leads different Soviet researchers to different conclusions, too. For example, this writer has for many years supported the idea of a Ministry of State Committee for Northern Affairs in the U.S.S.R., analogous to the Canadian Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, as an integrated body co-ordinating the development of the North and capable of ensuring a special regional approach to the organization of its economy. However, today, in the atmosphere of a general "combat against bureaucracy", the idea of a new and, in many people's view, "bureaucratic" organ of management does not enjoy any special appeal. Even so, many aspects of the Canadian experience in the development of the northern territories attract keen interest from Soviet specialists: high labour efficiency with a relatively low number of those employed in northern industry; the use of specialized machines and equipment; priority development of the transportation infrastructure; and some community planning decisions (for example, at Fermont in northern Quebec).

It is interesting that many Canadian specialists in this field have a similarly positive assessment of the Soviet experience. Whereas Soviet builders admire Canadian achievements in the construction of small mobile houses and "living modules" for the North, of which entire "mobile cities" are often assembled, Canadians have high regard for Soviet experience in building multi-storey houses and structures on permafrost, and in the construction of large, multi-functional centres such as Noril'sk with a population of 200 000 at 60°N latitude-a city Pierre Trudeau once called "one of the modem marvels of the world". Also impressive is the complete absence of unemployment in the Soviet North, notably among the indigenous population; in traditional industries, such as reindeer breeding, there is actually a shortage of manpower. Nor can anyone deny the accomplishments in the development of public education in the native languages of northern peoples. One of the things that promotes the participation of the indigenous population of the northern territories in the settlement of their problems is the territorial autonomy of many northern peoples in the U.S.S.R.

 This mutually positive appraisal of each other's "northern" experience creates a rather favourable atmosphere for Soviet-Canadian co-operation in the development of the northern territories. That co-operation may serve as a prototype for the development of East-West relations, both bilateral and multilateral, in many other fields.

 Our experience is mutually complementary. The natural and climatic conditions of the Canadian North and the structural distinctions of its resource potential are strikingly similar to those in the Soviet Union (and include as important a factor as the distances between the South and the northern territories under development). In addition, the principal direction of economic activity in the Canadian North is very similar to that of the Soviet North, although somewhat smaller in scope: large-scale development of mineral, oil, and gas resources; construction of railways, highways, and pipelines; exploration of the arctic shelf and sea-lanes; and town planning in permafrost conditions.

 Finally, the place of the Canadian North in the country's economic system and in the structure of Canada's modem economic links resembles to a much greater extent the place of the Soviet North in the Soviet economic system than that of Alaska in the United States, Greenland in Denmark, or the northern territories in Scandinavia.

Murmansk Initiative

 In his Murmansk speech of 1 October 1987 (called the "Murmansk initiative" in the West), Mikhail Gorbachev urged the intensification of co-operation between arctic and northern states on a bilateral and multilateral basis. The Soviet Union and Canada, which have already scored a number of spectacular successes in this area, could lead the way in fostering multilateral cooperation-always a challenge from an organizational perspective.

In the first two points of his six-point program, Gorbachev called for a relaxation of military tension in northern Europe through establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone and restrictions on naval activity in adjacent seas. As a first step toward spreading confidence-building measures to the whole of the Arctic, this directly concerns Canada, but within the framework of multilateral agreements.

Peaceful co-operation in the development of the northern regions, including the Arctic-the third point of the program-could add a new dimension to Soviet-Canadian relations and be tested for feasibility through bilateral co-operation. In this respect, Gorbachev optimistically observed that, through joint effort, it could be possible to work out an overall concept of rational development for northern areas. In this context, the most important questions, theoretically, are: Why do we need to develop northern areas, and how are we going to do it?

 There are two different points of view on this matter. According to one of them, the focus should be on the developed South. The North is of secondary importance and requires neither extensive settlement nor the establishment of sizeable miscellaneous industries. This viewpoint relies largely on two principles of work. In accordance with the first principle, personnel are hired for a comparatively short term; for example, a season. In accordance with the second, work shifts are rotated every two weeks.

 This technique has been widely practiced by Canadian private companies, whose policy of "skimming" has brought about sharp criticism on the part of Canadian scientists and the public.

 The second point of view calls for extensive development and settlement of northern areas, and the establishment of major multi-functional cities. This is a far-from-perfect method, which can give rise to major ecological problems in this particularly vulnerable environment. Besides, it demands huge initial investments that will require a long time to pay off. Grandiose projects are usually appearing but often unprofitable. Is it really worth while developing secondary, miscellaneous industries and attracting settlers if the creation of normal living conditions in the North costs much more than it does in the South? And even if the comprehensive and "harmonious" development of the northern economy is essential, could it be achieved by training locals? And, if so, will they be able to preserve their national culture? The questions are too many for comfort.

 Apparently, there is a third way, based on the rational choice of essential industries, a sensible combination of development techniques, and a reasonable degree of local involvement in the industrialization process. There is an urgent need for a scientifically sound approach to the development of northern areas. This is where Soviet-Canadian co-operation could be particularly useful.

This is actually the fourth point of the Gorbachev program, which calls for the scientific exploration of the Arctic. It emphasizes that questions bearing on the interests of the indigenous population of the North, on the study of its ethnic distinctions, and on the development of cultural ties between northern peoples require special attention. All the issues covered in this and the fifth point of the program, calling for co-operation in environmental protection, have been dealt with in the currently effective Soviet-Canadian program for scientific and technical co-operation in the problems of the Arctic and the North. Drafted according to the protocol on Soviet-Canadian consultations of 16 April 1984, it is divided into four sections, dealing with geological science and arctic oil; environmental control in the North and the Arctic; construction in the North; and ethnography and education.

Co-operation in transportation in the North could be one of the most promising areas of Soviet-Canadian co-operation, although it has not yet been added to the above program. Here, too, we face a number of important theoretical and applied problems. But it also offers ample opportunity for exchanges in the fields of know-how and technology. For example, the Soviet Union has purchased Canadian all-terrain vehicles from Foremost Industries of Calgary for use in Siberia. In exchange, we can offer our ample experience in arctic navigation.

 In the sixth point of the program, Mikhail Gorbachev offered to open the Northern Sea Route to foreign ships, with the Soviet Union providing ice-breaker services.

 The offer refers to more than just a right of passage. The Northern Sea Route is a complex infrastructure whose development (fairways, ice reconnaissance, weather services, and other land-based agencies) has cost millions of roubles and requires many millions more. Permitting other ships to use it will be the same as allowing Soviet trains to run on the Canadian National line. In addition to certain economic prerequisites, this implies creating an international situation of trust and co-operation, and, above all, ending military confrontation in the Arctic.

 Soviet-Canadian co-operation in the North, including scientific contacts, will promote trust and help turn northern areas into a zone of genuine peace and fruitful co-operation.

Arkadi Cherkasov is Doctor of Geography at the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada in Moscow.