Murray Coolican is a member of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee. Mr. Coolican served as Chair of"Nunavut: Nation Building in Canada's North."

Murray Coolican: In June of 1987, CARC and the Inuit Committee on National Issues sponsored a two-day conference on aboriginal self-government and constitutional reform. The context for that conference was the recent failure of the constitutional discussions on aboriginal self-government and the euphoria over the agreement on Meech Lake. Things have kind of flipped now. But here we are again. Part of that conference focused on Nunavut as one option for achieving a form of aboriginal self-government for one area of the North. I was happy to accept this invitation from CARC and the Inuit to chair another workshop but this time focusing solely on Nunavut. I am saddened and somewhat frustrated that once again we are still talking about it rather than getting on with it.

As Ron mentioned, initiatives to divide the N.W.T. go back a long way. In fact, they date back to the 1960s when both the Diefenbaker and Pearson governments tabled bills on the subject. Then, it was a matter of good public government. Since 1976, the Inuit have been actively pursuing division and the creation of a new territory. For the Inuit, it has become a matter of both good public government and, perhaps more important, self-government.

We should remember that in April of 1982, a plebiscite in the N.W.T. found that 80 per cent of the voters in the eastern Arctic favoured division. Throughout the Tcrritories, 56.5 per cent of voters were in favour. The plebiscite was followed by the creation of the Nunavut Constitutional Forum and the Western Constitutional Forum. Public meetings were held- according to some, ad nausea~across the Territories. And then there was an agreement which unfortunately led to what may be called "boundary paralysis". Once again, in April of 1990, an agreement-in-principle was signed, and in Article 4 the Government of Canada, the Government of the Northwest Territories, and TFN restated their support for the creation of a Nunavut territory and the financing of a Nunavut government outside the claims agreement as soon as possible. Then, on October 19, the Government of the Northwest Territories and TFN wrote to the Prime Minister to set out a timetable for Nunavut. The timetable for Nunavut is now a year-and-a-half for agreement and legislation and then an additional five years on top of that to allow for a gradual implementation process.

I hope today's discussions will be open and honest; where there are impediments to Nunavut, where there are differences of opinion, where there are problems, it's important that they come out on the table. But let's not allow the problems to once again paralyse progress; let's see if we can focus on solutions to the issues that come out rather than just dealing with them as problems. Let's not avoid them, let's not paper them over, but let's see if we can't make some progress, so that when we get together in another three years we'll be talking about the implementation of Nunavut. not the legislation and the process to create it.

The TFN Perspective

 Bob Kadlun is Vice-President of the Tungavik Federation of Nunavat.

Bob Kadlun: There have been a lot of discussions between Inuit leaders and governments-federal governments, territorial governments, even at the First Ministers' Conference level-and today we are still talking about Nunavut, the Inuit homeland. That just proves that Inuit are determined. It's been over 15 years. We're a little bit closer to meeting the objective of creating a Nunavut territory. I will discuss these points very briefly. Nunavut: Where we are now? How did we get here? Where we are going?

In the conference kits, you will find a letter to the Prime Minister that was signed last week by the government leader of the territorial government, Dennis Patterson, and Paul Quassa, president of TFN. It contains very important elements which I wish to address this morning. One of the most important elements in that letter is that TFN and the territorial government are going to be working together and have agreed on when and how a Nunavut territory with its own government should be brought about. This agreement is more than just an agreement-in-principle. Rather, it is an agreement to roll up our sleeves and get on with the job. It is for this reason that the letter to the Prime Minister seeks some initial assurances as to the financing of a Nunavut government in a way that is consistent with the public-sector requirements of the residents of both Nunavut and the Mackenzie. This letter requires the federal government to get down to business on Nunavut, to recognize that a practical, political accommodation between the representatives of TFN and the territorial government obliges the federal government to convert its past statements of support for Nunavut into concrete commitments. That's important, because throughout the last decade governments have always supported the concept of creating a Nunavut territory. Different governments in Ottawa have expressed their general support, but now it's time to get down to serious business and look at having the Nunavut territory legislation enacted in Parliament by 1992. That's one year from now, so I am hopeful that the territorial government, with its commitment to working very closely with TFN, will assist us right throughout the next 14 months. I am also hopeful that the federal government will be receptive-as they have always indicated their support-and cough up the dollars that will be required to put this thing in gear.

Inuit have always maintained that there has to be political change in the N.W.T., especially in the eastern part of the Territories, the Inuit homeland. We have fought long and hard trying to convince the governments that negotiating a land claims agreement is fine, but that without any political clout, any final agreement negotiated or ratified by the parties is not going to deliver very much. We need to look after economic development for Inuit, economic self-sufficiency. We also have to look at delivering real, democratically elected people into a government that is designed by people in the eastern and central Arctic. This government will be designed by them. I hope you don't mind me saying this, but the territorial government is the last colonial government existing in Canada. It was basically flown in from Ottawa to Yellowknife in April 1967. So Inuit aspirations for a Nunavut territory are serious. We feel that unless there is significant progress toward the creation of a Nunavut territory, the final agreement-no matter how good it is-will probably not be ratified by the constituents that TFN represents. That song has been echoed time and time again by TFN and its predecessors over the last 15 years. That is, if the Government of Canada wants a final agreement ratified, then there has to be work on the Nunavut front; getting only 50 percent of the Inuit agenda is not going to be good enough.

The present land claims policy as it is written does not prevent Inuit from negotiating Nunavut provisions, negotiating political change. What we did achieve in December 1989 at the eleventh-hour negotiations with the minister of Indian and northern affairs was a commitment that the territorial and federal governments have always expressed their support for the creation of a Nunavut territory in principle, and a commitment by TFN and the territorial government to work on a process. That letter to the Prime Minister signed within the last 10 days commits both parties to convince the federal government to take this matter very seriously.

We're very enthusiastic about getting the work done, and we're hopeful that the federal government, Brian Mulroney, his Cabinet colleagues, and especially Tom Siddon, will respond in the affirmative and try and create a Nunavut territory by the time we have a final agreement. We hope to have a final agreement negotiated by October 1991 by the very latest. But at the present time, TFN negotiations are ahead of schedule. Internally, we're targeting June, July, or August for a final agreement, provided that there are no major political problems. There are a few looming at the moment, but we can fix them. One of the most important elements that we see as crucial is the matter of finances. If Nunavut is going to work, there must be sufficient finances to run it, sufficient money to put in infrastructure, and sufficient money to allow TFN and the territorial government to try and get Nunavut legislation enacted in Parliament by 1992. So, the first thing we have to address with the Government of Canada is: Are they serious about their support in principle for the creation of a Nunavut territory with its own government? And, number two: Are they prepared to cough up the bucks? We can get into very detailed discussions after we get the federal government convinced that they will provide the dollars to implement Article 4 of the agreement-in-principle signed April 30 by both levels of government and TFN.

When Inuit talk about creating Nunavut there are some people who may be a little bit afraid that we're trying to split the Territories along ethnic lines. That is not the case. Nunavut and its own government will serve every citizen in Nunavut. We're quite fortunate in the Nunavut region. We have people from British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan; we even have people from Quebec. It's not an ethnic government. It will not be based on anything ethnic. The only difference is that roughly 85 per cent of the population in the 27 or so communities that TFN represents is Inuit. There's a five-year freeze before the Nunavut Act is enacted in Parliament. And that's to allow people to get organized, to give people in the N.W.T. ample time to work out their constitutional arrangements with both levels of government-Dene, Metis, and the non-Dene people in the West. We'll give them the opportunity to work out those arrangements. There is going to be a lot of work, so we're hopeful that by 1997 a Nunavut territory and a western territory will be created, with their own governments designed and implemented by people in the territories themselves

Canadian sovereignty has always been challenged in the North, especially in the Inuit homeland where everybody is aware of the Manhattan and the Polar Sea, the Americans running around with their nice, big ships without any permission from the Canadian government. And there has been talk about the Polar-8, a very expensive boat to assert sovereignty. Why not create a government as wished by the people in the three regions of Nunavut? When I was involved with the Nunavut Constitutional Forum from the early 1980s until 1987, we were looking at spending an additional $300 million to put in infrastructure and additional senior-level public service, and initially looking at a very good legislative assembly. Initially, it would entail probably I 5 to 25 MLAs, and the purpose of that was to put the elected people to work on further refining a Nunavut government; after that, it would be reduced in size. A Nunavut government, at least the territorial legislative assembly, would bc reduced based on the recommendations of legislative committees.

We're presently waiting for the Prime Minister to respond to the joint letter of last week that was signed by the territorial government and TFN. We are hopeful that the Prime Minister will indicate his support for the creation of Nunavut in light of all the constitutional wrangling that has been going on for the last six years. There has to be some real progress on the constitutional front, and the North is a very good place to start. So we're hopeful that within the next couple of weeks, we will get a positive response, and the territorial government and TFN are now ready and willing to get moving on it. We have a very enthusiastic group of people working on the Nunavut front, and we're very hopeful that the Prime Minister will also delegate very enthusiastic people from within the federal government to make the Inuit dream a reality-that's the enactment of Nunavut territory legislation by 1992.

The Territorial Perspective

Bob Overvold is Principal Secretary to the Government Leader of the Northwest Territories. 

Bob Overvold: The question from our point of view has always been how and when to create Nunavut; it has never been a question of "if''. I think, with the signature of the government leader to the October letter, we have not only reaffirmed the commitment of the GNWT to Nunavut; we have committed ourselves to working toward the introduction of legislation defining a Nunavut territory and government as early as 1992. We have answered one of the important "when" questions. With the introduction of legislation in 1992, its subsequent enactment, and the passage of an additional five years, we could ideally see a Nunavut government operating with a full slate of legislative and administrative powers, similar to those of the current territorial government, around the turn of the century.

However, the letter does not address all of the "when" questions. There are still a host of important "when" questions to be identified, stated, and answered. These are actually questions which relate to how Nunavut will be created, because the letter, quite understandably, says very little about how Nunavut will be created. We in the GNWT recognize that there are a variety of options open to the people of the Northwest Territories and the governments of Canada and the N.W.T. as to how Nunavut will be implemented in that period between the introduction of legislation and the full assumption of legislative and administrative capacities. Many of the "hows" and a number of the "whens" remain unanswered.

But, as Bob said, we are now in a situation where we have to roll up our sleeves and get on with the work. And believe you me, he is not understating the case. There is a lot of work ahead of us if we are to successfully achieve our objective of creating Nunavut. We are not so naive to believe that the letter from the GNWT and TFN is enough to launch the process. We recognize that the Government of Canada has the ultimate authority and capacity to make Nunavut a reality in this time-frame. Hopefully, the letter and conferences like this-and hopefully there will be many more-will convince the Government of Canada that this is not an issue to be dwarfed by other national issues, which understandably demand its attention. We also recognize that other actors have a role in this exercise, this drama. From the perspective of the GNWT, the most important of these is the Northern public. It is this theme that I will speak to.

Stated briefly, the northern public must be supported, or division and Nunavut will not happen, in my view. Moreover, that support must be generated and expressed over the next little while-we are talking months as opposed to years if we are to meet a deadline of legislation by 1992 or reasonably thereafter. Before that support can be expressed, certain predictable and understandable anxieties must be addressed. And the broader significance of division must be communicated to the public at large. Notwithstanding the broad public support for the Inuit homeland and the logic of division, the public will want to know what the creation of Nunavut in the time-frame the GNWT and the TFN have composed means to the individual, to the communities, to the regions.

From a western perspective, the public will be concerned about several issues. The main question is straightforward and is a reflection of the importance of government in the northern reality. The average person will want to know what Nunavut means to him or her. Will it make life better, or will it make life worse? Everyone knows that it costs money to create a government, and it costs more money to run two governments than it does one government. Some people will assume the worst and will wonder, Does this mean higher taxes? Does it mean I will lose my job, either because it will be moved east or the money that pays for it will no longer be available? Does it mean a deterioration in the level of government services? Does it mean that there will no longer be money for a new school, a new hospital, or even a continuation of an existing school or hospital? Predictably, people in places like Yellowknife will have very specific anxieties.

This is particularly important as we enter a seeming recession. It is important that all of us with an interest in seeing Nunavut as a reality come to understand and begin to communicate to the public and defend the message that division is an opportunity to improve our lives. Through a combination of factors, we can preserve the level of public services, improve on the organization of government, and minimize any negative impacts. However, we must be prepared to communicate concrete actions which will be taken to this end, and the public must know if there is a net cost to division, if indeed that is the case.

One element which fits into the picture is devolution-the federal government turning over more responsibility to northerners for their governments. Devolution allows for not only increased control by northerners in the East and in the West-and is therefore desirable for that reason alone-but it allows for an offset to western communities like Yellowknife which may expect a significant impact. You know, I can understand why people from the East sometimes resent it when the question of constitutional development in the West is raised in the context of Nunavut. But it is a factor-and Bob certainly recognized that in his address-which must be taken into account if Nunavut is to become a reality. The Northwest Territories Act will have to be amended, and new boundaries will have to be defined. Specifically, and again Bob referred to it, the anxieties of the Dene-Metis will have to be addressed. The ratios of aboriginal to non-aboriginal in the West will be affected. The boundary issue, as everyone knows, is volatile, to say the least. We raise these issues not to defeat our objectives regarding Nunavut but to identify work that must be done in order to meet our objectives. Specifically, we are committed to do everything we can to generate broad public support for Nunavut, knowing that we can't do it alone-TFN and the people of thc East are involved, the federal government is involved.

At a minimum, "everything we can" means producing at least the necessary information that will allow the public to realize the potential of Nunavut, to allow all of us to make an informed opinion on the cost of creating Nunavut, if indeed there will be costs. This requires early agreement with the Government of Canada on how future governments will be financed and, second, introducing measures that will provide for progress in western constitutional development consistent with the Nunavut agenda. In other words, measures must allow for parallel western constitutional development. In conclusion, the GNWT looks forward to working intensely, rolling up her sleeves, getting on with it, with the Government of Canada and TFN, in the upcoming months to ensure that Northerners of all backgrounds, wherever they may live, will realize a fairer place in the political and economic realities of Canada.

The Federal Perspective

 Richard Van Loon is the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Northern Affairs with the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

Richard Van Loon: In introducing the panel, Mr. Coolican suggested that the federal government's approach to land claims negotiations since 1986 has been to put a lid on land claims and to proceed slowly. That's just not true. If I were less polite, I would use a stronger term.

In 1986, we took the work of a very good task force, chaired by Mr. Coolican-we didn't implement all of those recommendations, but we did implement a lot of them. Among the recommendations was one to regularize the process of land claims negotiations by introducing a process that used framework agreements, agreements-in-principle, then, finally, final agreements. Since 1982, in a four-year period, the federal government has signed three framework agreements, three agreements-in-principle, and two front-end agreements (one of which will shortly become abortive, but we will change the approach in the Dene-Métis claim). We have also succeeded over the last six months in "impregnating" the Government of British Columbia, getting them into land claims negotiations. I think it's almost safe to say that they have passed the twelfth week of that impregnation, that they're properly trapped in the process now, and that prospects for actually having productive land claims negotiations in British Columbia are not bad, and a good deal better maybe than the Government of British Columbia might like.

I should also say that the Government of Canada has, over the last four years, paid a great deal of attention to land claims. I was just counting, as I prepared to speak, how many times we've been to Cabinet on land claims issues in the last four years. I make it 15 times. Now I don't know all the areas of government, but I do know the social policy area of government very thoroughly, and I know that in no other part of social policy or human resource policy has Cabinet spent anything like that much time on an issue. So to suggest that the Government of Canada has put aside the issue or put a lid on land claims issues and proceeded slowly is not right.

Now I also want to say that it is not the intention of the government as a result of the Oka situation or anything else to make major changes in the land claims policy. Mr. Siddon has already said that it is not our intention to introduce the constitutional protection of self-government arrangements through land claims negotiations and that it is not our intention to go further than accepting two out of the three recommendations for dealing with the ex-problem of extinguishment suggested by the Coolican commission. I say that because I want to make it very clear that people should not anticipate changes in the core of land claims policy. And I say that to this forum because I want to make it very clear that we will not undercut the current agreements. TFN negotiated an agreement in good faith based on current land claims policy, and we don't intend to change that policy and undercut that agreement. The same is true in the CYI [Council for Yukon Indians] case, and the same is true in the Dene-Métis case.

So, as far as we're concerned, we have put a great deal of attention into land claims. We will continue to put a great deal of attention into land claims. We will continue to work just as hard as we possibly can to get these settlements, but we are not going to change the policy in major ways that will undercut the TFN agreement.

Bob Overvold made a key point in suggesting that the issue of Nunavut is not an issue that can be viewed as just an eastern Arctic issue. From the perspective of the Government of Canada, the creation of Nunavut is not the creation of one territory-it is the creation of two. So when we are looking at this issue, we look at it not only in the perspective of the eastern Arctic, but in the perspective of the western Arctic, and in the perspective of broad constitutional development in the North. I think Murray suggested that if we view this in the context of broad constitutional development, then this whole issue-the creation of Nunavut, the relationship between the Government of Canada and the western Arctic and the eastern Arctic and the Yukon-is all a continuation of the process of nation building that we've been engaged in for at least the last l SO years. In effect, what we are doing in the North is creating provinces. With due respect to Mr. Robertson, who has suggested that there may be other way-stations on the way to provincehood in the North, the end-point I don't think is in doubt. The end-point is that there will be further provinces, just as the end-point of evolution through the latter part of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century in western Canada was the creation of Alberta and Saskatchewan. It is simply inevitable. Whether or not there is a stopping point on the way, whether there is a constitutional half-way station is an interesting question-certainly one we have to come to grips with in the not-far-distant future-but the end-point is not in doubt. The end-point from the perspective of the Government of Canada is the creation of provinces in the North.

I think, too, that there's not much doubt that the structure in the North will be three provinces. There will be, of course, a Yukon province. There will be a western Arctic province. And there will be an eastern Arctic province called Nunavut. So, again from a long-term point of view, the end-point is not in doubt. What we have to come to grips with is how we're going to get there from here. We suggested that there were some preconditions for division in the North and, ultimately, for the creation of provinces. The conditions that the federal government suggested in 1982 were, first of all, continuing support for division by a majority of Northerners; second-not easy-an agreement on a boundary; third, the settlement of aboriginal land claims; and, fourth, the agreement on the division of powers between the territorial level of government and the regional level of government. Now let me just look at each of those in turn.

We will, of course, need evidence of continuing Northern support, but certainly I don't have any doubts about it. So the question here probably is more one of how we express Northern support, how we assure its continuation, but not anything really deeper than that.

We said that another requirement of division in the North was the agreement on a boundary-an obvious requirement, but one which has been very elusive. When the 1982 plebiscite was held, the boundary was undetermined. I guess the assumption by many people, at least in 1982, was that thc boundary would be the tree-line. The 1987 Iqaluit Agreement proposed using the claim boundary for the Nunavut settlement region. And I guess that's still what most people think is the most likely boundary line. Particularly when you look at the provisions of a claim agreement, and you realize that so

much of the management of land and resources is tied up in the stipulations of the claim agreement, it really does not make much sense to use anything other than a claim boundary line for the creation of division in the Territories. But, of course, there we have an issue, since there is still not agreement on the boundary line between the two claim groups. Now, we have been working with TFN and the Dene-Métis to come to an agreement on the boundary. It's an issue that makes me squimm a bit because our position almost has to be that the boundary line must be agreed upon by two groups or political entities. And yet, so far, so bad. So we face in the federal government increasing and very evident pressure for the creation of two territories in the North, but we don't face an agreement on the boundary. If anybody has any suggestions they will be gratefully received. But it may be something that we have to face directly at the time we arrive at a final agreement on the TFN claim, and it's also something that we have to face almost immediately in the context of land-selection negotiations in the Keewatin region with TFN.

The third condition that the federal government suggested should apply to the division issue was the settlement of land claims. Now I have already said a bit about our progress in that respect. We don't have any reason to fear for the future of the TFN negotiations. They seem to be proceeding about as one would expect; they have their rough spots, but there seems to be a strong will to settle. We, of course, have great concerns about the success of the Dene-Métis negotiations, and I suppose we may very well face the issue of the creation, or the division, of the North with the claims business partly done but not completely done. Would we waive the requirement for the settlement of land claims before we would go ahead with division in the North? Well, prediction in an area like this is extremely risky, but my guess would be Yes. If we had a land claim agreement in the eastern Arctic and much, but not all of our business done in the western Arctic, I suspect that the position of the Government of Canada (and I am not speaking here as a minister or as someone who is working with settled policy) would be to not hold up the political evolution of the North or the strong wishes of Northerners for division because one part of the land claims business was not completed. Again, I have to emphasize that's just speculation on my part.

Finally, the federal government had suggested in 1982 that it was a pre-requirement of division in the North that we know about the structure of government, that we know the relationship between the territorial, regional. and local levels.

Well, we certainly have to know something about the structure of government before we can deal with division in the North because part of the business of division in the North is to create de facto constitutions for the two territories or what will eventually become two provinces. To do that, we have to know something about the structure of government. But whether we have to know about the relationship between the territorial level and the regional and local levels is another point, another question. And I suspect that more recent thinking in Ottawa would be that we should not entomb, enshrine, or encase the relationship between territorial governments and the regional and local levels in federal legislation. That's a matter to be worked out in the North, and it isn't really a requirement that we know all the details or all the relationships between the territorial level and local and regional levels before we go ahead with division.

There are a number of constitutional options for proceeding with division in the North. I guess "constitutional options" isn't really the right term. The right term is "procedural options". First of all, we could pass legislation which effectively mirrors the current Northwest Territories Act. That would be the quickest thing to do, but it wouldn't be very satisfying because it wouldn't tell us very much about the structure of government in the North. And it would leave unresolved or undealt with a number of things which are a nuisance to us and presumably vexing to Northerners. For example, such things as the requirement that ordinances of the Government of the Northwest Territories be tabled in Parliament and be provided to thc Governor-in-Council. For example, the requirement that there be a federal order-in-council before there can be a dissolution of the legislative assembly and an election in the North. Really, that's just not consistent with current reality. For example, the requirement that the minister of Northern affairs approve territorial arrangements with provinces for things like admission of patients to mental institutions or neglected children to foster homes. It's just too much interference, and it's not something that the federal government would ever activate, in the sense we do this on a pro forma basis, but we do not actively interfere. So what's the point in doing it at all? The federal government is required to pass an order-in-council to enable the "commissioner" (that is, the Government of the Northwest Territories) to enter into federal-territorial agreements. Again, rather silly. So there are a lot of things in the Northwest Territories Act which probably should be dealt with and cleaned up anyway and which could be dealt with and cleaned up as part of the process of division. Anothcr possibility is substantial revision of the act to make the structure of the N.W.T. more closely resemble that of a province-replacing the commissioner with a lieutenant-governor and taking away the term "chief executive officer" as applied to the commissioner, because we all know that the commissioner is not that at all. Or removing the possibility for ministerial instructions to the commissioner or lieutenant governor. A final option would be a novel constitutional arrangement, and on this Mr. Robertson has eloquently outlined the possibilities in a publication a few years ago. There are a number of possible arrangements here, and we are willing to listen to the requests of Northerners in that respect.

The recent letter from the GNWT and TFN to the Prime Minister, I think, is a very useful goad to the process of division in the North. It's quite a comfortable position frankly for the federal government to say that Northerners must decide the business of division. It kind of passes the issue off to Northerners and allows us to put into a kind of Never Never Land the vexed problem of dealing with issues like how much money we are willing to put into this exercise. So the joint letter puts the onus back on us, and I can tell you from working inside the federal government that if you want changes to happen, you have to have pressure from the outside, not just from the inside. Having that pressure put on us is valuable, very useful. However, the system here in Ottawa will have certain questions which will be raised before the Prime Minister will answer the letter. One of those questions will be, "How does all of this fit into the great world of Canadian constitutional development?" Our answer to that ultimately will be, "We haven't the faintest idea." We haven't the faintest idea, because we really don't know where Canadian constitutional development is going.

So we will ask that question, we will fulminate about it around town, but in the end I don't think we will really expect to answer it. And I expect that the interests of Northern division and of the evolution toward provincehood in the North will be best served if we can minimize the amount of time we can spend on that question and, to some degree, segregate the business of Northern political development from the issues that will inevitably swirl around constitutional development in the South. Now we won't be able to escape that maelstrom entirely. One way in which it will affect us is that it will take a lot of the time of the Prime Minister, the minister of state for federal/provincial relations, and all of the people who are concerned with constitutional development over the next several years to deal with our constitutional problems here in the South. Inevitably, they will want to have some say in constitutional evolution in the North, so the distraction of their time from this issue will be a problem for us. None the less, I suspect it's a problem that can be dealt with.

Another major question that the system will ask is: How much? It's the safest prediction in government that the moment we put forward a proposal for the division of the North, our colleagues in the Department of Finance and the Treasury Board will say, "Oh, but we couldn't possibly ever approve such a thing until we Know to the last cent how much it will cost." Now we will never be able to satisfy the requirement to give them a detailed accounting down to the last cent of how much this will cost. But they do have a point. It will cost something. I don't think anyone can sit here and say that this thing will be cost-neutral. And the cost will inevitably be borne by the taxpayers of Canada.

Again, not to put too fine a point on it, there isn't going to be enough economic development in the North, in the tax generating sense, for the North "to pay its own way" or even come as close to paying its own way as Newfoundland does in the foreseeable future. So taxpayers in the South are going to have to foot the bill for division and constitutional development in the North. In that sense, it's a perfectly fair question for tax-payers in Canada represented by the Department of Finance and the Treasury Board to ask for a good idea of what all this is going to cost and to make some comments and some stipulations about those costs.

In that context, I have to introduce a cautionary remark, which is that you can't assume that the federal government will simply agree to cough up the bucks and get on with it. I'm sorry...I wish I could say we will, but I can't. A convincing case is going to have to be made that, number one, we know what we're getting into, that we can tell what the costs are going to be; and, number two, that it's worth it to you, in the sense that you want this so strongly that the future of Canada will be much better with it than without it, and that it's worth it to other Canadians who are, in a sense, buying something here by footing the bill...worth it in the sense of giving them a better self-image, worth it in the sense of making them feel better about themselves as they support constitutional development in the North. That's going to have to be a very important thing that we're all going to have to concentrate on in the next year or two as we move toward putting legislation in front of Parliament that calls for division in the North. That's the challenge I would throw out to you in concluding my remarks. It's evident to you that it's worth it to do this. You wouldn't be here if it wasn't. It's evident to you that it's worth coughing up the bucks to handle this, that it's worth any amount of money, but it isn't going to be automatically evident to the Government of Canada representing the taxpayers of Canada. We're going to have to make that case together.

Panel Discussion and Question Period

Bob Kadlun: I thought Rick Van Loon's presentation was quite straight forward. It raises a lot of issues that the Nunavut Constitutional Forum has dealt with in the past. It reminded me of that because TFN has been more actively involved in negotiating the claim, and TFN itself within the last two years took over the political development file. There has been a lot of work and research done through the Inuit Constitutional Forum, and these research papers have been distributed quite widely.

We have put some thought into how much it's going to cost. Having been involved in negotiations over the last 12 years and a bit, I know the easiest way for governments to not do anything is to say, "We have no money." For example, in our communities there are social development committees that need dollars to function effectively, and when they go to the government they are told there is no money. So nothing happens at the community level. So, is it worth it? In my view, it is worth it. Nunavut is worth it. If you look at the Western societies which have free democracies, you will see that they will go to any lengths to defend democracy. You know, $20 billion to insert democracy again in the Middle East...easy. So that tells you that democracy is very, very important. People take it seriously. It has been taken for granted over the last several years here, especially with the constitutional crisis over the last six years of negotiations. I think it's very important that Canadians understand that they cannot deny democracy to people in the Northwest Territories. We are, as Canadian as they are. If it means putting in governments that are designed by the people, run by the people, elected by the people in the N.W.T. and the Yukon, it's worth it. I think people in Canada are very fortunate-at least they were until June. Their governments can get together and negotiate constitutional arrangements. The governments in the North, however, have been left out, so they're basically outside looking in, wishing they had the same status and power as the other 11 first ministers.

John Merritt [Tungavik Federation of Nunavat]: I have two questions-one for Rick Van Loon and one for Bob Overvold. The first relates to the relationship between claims and the creation of Nunavut. Rick, you talked about the government not wanting to change its current claims policy. It is my understanding that the letter to the PM would not involve the Government of Canada being asked to make commitments that would offend the current claims policy and that the idea of parallel legislation would, in fact, be one within the claims policy. You didn't speak to that point specifically, so I wonder if you can speculate on that. The second question is related to constitutional change in the Mackenzie, and perhaps Bob Overvold could speculate on what the prospects are for some kind of resumption of constitutional discussions there.

Richard Van Loon: Well, I read the letter the same way you do. It's not asking for a commitment that the creation of Nunavut be constitutionally protected by way of attachment to the comprehensive claims settlement but, rather, requests a legislative commitment to the creation of Nunavut, which essentially leaves Nunavut in the same constitutional status as the other two territorial governments. And again it's always risky for me to speak constitutionally. This is not something that has been visited by the Cabinet yet. But I do not think it would be problematic for the government to countenance the legislative approach.

Bob Overvold: I don't have any definitive answer to your question. For almost 10 years now, constitutional development in the Northwest Territories has been through the forum of the constitutional alliance and due bodies set up. That forum is no longer there. I guess, ideally, we would want something like that-at least in the West-a forum that is more non-government-oriented. But I don't know if that will happen. I think that, at a minimum, the legislative assembly and the Cabinet have a role to play in creating something so that constitutional development in the West can get off the ground again.

Gordon Robertson [Constitutional Adviser]: Rick Van Loon said that a fundamental question when this issue of legislation, or whatever it is that is done about separation, comes to the Cabinet is, "How much?" And that's right: the basic question then will be, "Is it worth it?" I think there could not possibly be a better time than right now to convince the government that not only is it worth it but it's very much worth it. When one says "worth it", one has to recognize that if this separation takes place, it will not be cost-neutral; it's going to cost some money. The money will be a significant amount in Northern Program terms. But in terms of the total national budget, it will not be a large or significant amount. So if the whole thing can appear to be significant for national reasons, it will become judged in the context that it will not loom large in cost terms. And I think at the present time it will very definitely be worth it in national terms and can be convincingly shown to be worth it.

What is the situation? The situation is that the entire future of Canada is in doubt. The Government of Canada is going to have to give number one attention to that question. It can do no other! It must give number one attention to that. In giving number one attention to that, it's not going to be able to take concerted action on aboriginal self-government or aboriginal rights. This is a terribly complex issue. It involves enormous effort and time, and this great national question is going to have to be resolved first. But, at the same time, the Government of Canada must show the aboriginal people that it is serious about aboriginal rights and aboriginal self-government. And I can think of no better way for it to show that it's serious than to do something about the division of the Territories and especially the establishment of the territory of Nunavut. The territory of Nunavut can be shown to be in response to the wishes of the Inuit people as expressed in the referendum of 1982 and since. It can be shown to be something where, with 80 per cent of the population of Nunavut being Inuit, it will be very definitely aboriginal self-government. It won't be exclusively for the aboriginal people, but, with 80 per cent of the population, it will be aboriginal self-government. And I think, in many ways, the fact that it is not exclusively Inuit is a big plus. It will be an opportunity to demonstrate that aboriginal self-government can be consistent with government of all, with total self-government, but definitely in the interests of the aboriginal people. So there is an opportunity to put this whole thing in a national context.

Another advantage is that it has been under discussion for a long time. The problems have been identified. Most of them have been resolved. I have the impression that the only significant one, perhaps, is the boundary question. The boundary question would have to be resolved. If there cannot be agreement between the Inuit and the Dene-Métis, there has to be some mechanism for resolution. This should not be permitted to hold the whole thing up, because the next 12 months will be a golden opportunity to move on this, to convince the government and the people of Canada that it's worth it, and to make a signif~cant demonstration that the Government of Canada is serious about aboriginal self-government.

Richard Van Loon: I think the remarks Mr. Robertson made are salutory in that in the whole national constitutional debate there is a stunning lack of perspective. We have managed to convince ourselves, perhaps as much because of the way the media have played the Meech Lake and constitutional crisis, that suddenly-between 1987 and 1990-the wheels fell off. Canada became no longer a governable entity, and the earlier arrangements no longer worked. We had never faced this kind of situation or anything remotely like it before, always conveniently forgetting that in 1921, there were 65 Progressive members elected to the federal Parliament. If the Reform Party does that well in the next election, I'll be mightily surprised. Always forgetting that as early as 1890, there was a party elected to the Government of Quebec called the Parti Nationale, whose metier was not to build Canada, but to build Quebec. We have forgotten many of the adjustments and difficulties that we've gone through over the years. We've lost that perspective partly because we've lost any sense of forward momentum in Canadian Confederation, any sense that there is still work to do in building the nation. Well, here is an opportunity, as Mr. Robertson says, to demonstrate that there is still work to do in building this nation, that there is still progress we can make, that there are still innovative arrangements that Canadians can devise to deal with the governing of remote localities, that there are accommodations that Canadians can work out between aboriginal people and non-aboriginal people, between remote regions and the rest of Canada. Well, Nunavut provides us with an opportunity to regain some forward momentum in Canadian Confederation and to recreate some of the perspective that we so badly need to create around our constitutional crisis.

Roger Gruben [Inavialuit Regional Corporation]: It seems like we are talking about democracy here, and I think Bobby alluded to the fact that countries in the Western Hemisphere are marshalling all their resources to protect their interests in other parts of the world, and that the cost of democracy is something that everyone can bear. But we must look seriously at democracy in our own home as it relates to Nunavut. In all of the comments that we have heard from the three panelists here today I have not heard one mention about allowing the people of the Beaufort Sea area to express our own opinion as to which territory we want to be in. It seems like it's a foregone conclusion that the Mackenzie Delta Beaufort Sea area is going to be in the West (if you talk to people from the Nunavut area). The opinion in the West is that we're going to be somewhere, maybe the West, maybe the East, but more likely in the East.

The point I'm making here is that no one has talked to us. We make mention of what happened in Quebec, but in our own backyards it seems like we have forgotten about a very significant group of the population. I guess I'm trying to make the point that if we're going to be looking at engaging public support for the creation of Nunavut at some point in the future, then we have to look very seriously at the manner in which we gauge that public support. Now I'm prepared, as a representative of the Inuvialuit settlement area and the Beaufort Sea area, to sit down with the Government of the Northwest Territories. I am prepared to sit down with those people promoting Nunavut. And I'm prepared to offer suggestions and comments to the federal government to include us in the process to allow for successful resolution.

 There are a number of issues which have to be brought forward; for example, the issue of the letter to Mulroney. As I interpret the letter-and maybe I'm interpreting it wrong-it seems to me that TFN and the territorial government are looking for assurance from the federal government that there will be monies available for the creation of Nunavut at some point in time, and for assurance that there will not be a downgrading of services as we know them today. To bring you back to the question of gaining public support-How do you gain that public support? I think what you've got to do is to indicate to them where thc boundary is going to be...they must know. Second, there should be enough information on the ballot to allow them to make a reasonably informed opinion as to the cost of creating a new territory. And I relate the cost to the level of services they are currently experiencing now. You know, it's my dollars that I'm paying to create this new territory. I should know if I am going to have a lowering of services. This brings me to the issue of taxation. The point that Rick Van Loon was making, as I understood it, is that there are really no projects in any region of the Territories that can support the internal infrastructure for the creation of a new territory. And I think that whoever is going to be making a decision as to the creation of a new territory should keep in mind that because of that you may have to tap into resources in the other territory to support yourself. For example, would Nunavut have to tap into the resources of the western territory to finance its operations? More particularly, would Nunavut have to tap into the potential oil and gas resources, as an example, to finance their territory? I think that should be addressed so that people know what kind of decision they're voting on when we gauge public support.

I agree that we don't necessarily have to fine-tune the relationships between the federal government and Nunavut, between the federal government and the territorial government, or between a Nunavut territory and the GNWT in great detail. But there should be some framework for guidelines and principles on what one would expect the relationship to be. The other point that should be made here concerns the existing territorial government and the devolution of powers from the federal government to that territory; this has to include some detail on how that further devolution of powers is going to affect the regional level. I think that is going to bc a big selling point for gaining public support.

The Inuvialuit have never been historically against division. I say that, as I am prepared to go back home and ask my people to support division provided they are able to make an informed decision on the creation of a new territory.

Bob Kadlun: First of all, with respect to the boundary question, the issue itself has been a sticky one. TFN has been in active negotiations with the Dene-Métis for the last seven years. My friend Bob pointed out that we have had agreements before and they have fallen apart. At the present time the federal government has appointed a fact-finder. He has been on thc job for several weeks, and at the present time I'm not sure what the status of the report is. So, hopefully, the fact-fmdcr will make some recommendations and outline the problem areas. The minister would then have to decide what his next step is going to be. TFN has advocated binding arbitration, but that requires both parties in a Dene-Métis/TFN agreement. So we'll have to wait and see. With respect to Inuvialuit in a post-Nunavut-legislation world, we've always made the assumption that the Inuvialuit would be looking at pursuing some form of regional government, such as the one that was advocated in the early 1980s-a western arctic regional municipality or some arrangement like that. We have also talked about working out special arrangements with the Inuvialuit in the event that Nunavut is created. We would have to get the discussions back on track with the Inuvialuit and Dene-Métis. Basically, that's why we have this five-year period before Nunavut comes into force.

We Inuit in the East are not very happy with the status quo of thc political systems in the North, and, because we are paying for the present operation of the governments themselves, we happily do it. They're our tax dollars too, and we want to change the status quo. And the biggest obstacle we have ahead of us is changing the minds of a lot of people in Ottawa who want to maintain the status quo.

David Hawkes [Queen's University]: I am curious about the conflicting views as to the support in the North for this development. I think Bob Overvold has given a perspective which indicates that, in his view, there's not broad support. I think other speakers, like Rick Van Loon and Gordon Robertson, indicated there was somewhat broader support. I would bc curious to have further comments along those lines.

Gurston Dacks [University of Alberta]: It's a related question, to Rick Van Loon. I was hoping you could expand on your comments concerning the degree of precision that you think the Government of Canada will want to have with regard to support for Nunavut. Will there be a referendum? To what extent will the Government of Canada want to approve the terms and administration, and will there be any decision on rules? For example, what happens if one region is markedly more in favour than another? I inferred from your comments that you thought perhaps the need was not that great, and I would appreciate a clarification.

Bob Overvold: In my view there is broad support for division. There is no question of that in my mind. When we get into process, there will be the reality of anxiety which Roger addressed. Unless we tackle these anxieties up front and deal with them, then support will go down.

Richard Van Loon: Well, first of all, our perception is that there is an extremely high level of support for division in the eastern Arctic. Opinion in the western Arctic is less strongly in support of division and also much less intense and focused on the issue of division. So you may have a classic political science conundrum here, with very intense support for something in one part of the territory and a relative degree of indifference in the other. Then there are two possibilities. One is that there is broad support throughout the territory, stronger in the East than in the West but generally there, in which case, we really don't have a decision problem. The other is that there is a situation of intense support in the East and relative pacifity in the West-in which case, you do have a decision problem. Well, I don't think you really have a decision problem, even then. If you have a territorial unit in which there is extremely strong support for a particular kind of government and a particular set of structural arrangements, then, in the end, that's what will happen. It may take a little longer under those circumstances, but it will happen. Canadians should not kid themselves that if there is extremely strong support in Quebec for sovereignty, it's going to happen. So I don't really see that we have a tremendous decision problem, and that's why I said in my opening remarks that it seemed to me that the issue of Nunavut is not "whether" but "when". It's really an issue of timing, not an issue of whether it's going to happen or not.

Gurston asked a question too about things the federal government would want to know before it went ahead with the necessary steps to put Nunavut in place. Yes, we would like to review the sort of question that is put forward in a plebiscite. But our review of it would have to be pretty light-fingered. It's certainly the overall approach of this government (and I don't really think it would change if the partisan stripe of government changed in Ottawa) that we ought not to interfere in what are essentially northern matters. So, yes, we need to be somewhat comforted about the nature of the question. But I don't think our interference would be very heavy-handed. We also would ask questions, you can be quite sure, about the nature of the government that would be put into place in Nunavut. Again, there is a delicate balance to walk here, but I don't think we would be particularly heavy-handed in trying to impose a lot of details on that government. Instead, our criteria would be the uncontroversial ones-that this must be public government. I think we all agree on that.