Prepared by the Arctic Council Panel

A Vision: The Mandate and Goals of an Arctic Council

 THOUGH THE ARCTIC HAS physical characteristics and socio-economic problems all its own, it has no generally accepted definition. It is variously defined as the area north of the beeline, north of 60° N, or north of the Arctic Circle at 66°N 33; or above the 100° C isotherm for the warmest month on land (and 15° C at sea). But any one characterization of the region is sure to leave someone and something out. The problem here is significant in that negotiations to establish an Arctic Council will have to produce broad agreement on (1) who is entitled to representation, (2) what does and does not constitute an international arctic issue, and (3) how the agenda is to be set and what the mandate of the new body should be. Our solution is to suggest that each arctic country begin by defining the area in accordance with its own history, culture, and patterns of land use by aboriginal peoples over the generations, and then merge their varied perspectives into a common conception of the region and what is to be accomplished there.

 Leaving questions of representation and agenda aside for the moment, let us consider what the mandate and the basic goals of an Arctic Council might be.

 The goals of an Arctic Council will be both substantive and procedural. Where substance is concerned, the ultimate mandate of an Arctic Council should be to make the circumpolar region into a domain of enhanced civility—an area in which aboriginal peoples enjoy their full rights, and where the governments that speak for southern majorities accord progressively greater respect to the natural environment, to one another, and, in particular, to aboriginal peoples.

An Arctic Council must help us protect and rehabilitate circumpolar ecosystems from the contamination that comes with inconsiderate industrial development in the Arctic and elsewhere. Though it is the common heritage of all arctic peoples, the circumpolar region is also a repository for global and, especially in the Soviet Union, locally produced contaminants. It is an area of the world that will be hardest hit by global warming, and will require intensive international co-operation in adapting to and preventing the most adverse effects of climate change. Arctic wildlife and wilderness are all the while experiencing multiple assaults. Grave insults are being administered to the renewable resources on which aboriginal cultures depend. The need for greater civility and respect in the relationship of humankind to its natural surroundings in the Arctic is reaching crisis proportions. On these grounds alone the creation of an Arctic Council is an urgent necessity.

 An Arctic Council must help find a way to abate and then end the uncivil practice of arctic states—the Soviet Union on the one hand, the United States, Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Iceland, and Norway as NATO countries on the other—whereby they threaten one another and indirectly the two non-aligned arctic countries—Finland and Sweden—with nuclear and lesser forms of destruction. The peace and security of the Arctic must be advanced through means other than the militarization of the region. Significant here is the capacity of non-military cooperation among the arctic countries to create a climate of trust and confidence and the custom of co-operation, whereby military matters may be addressed directly and effectively.

 Still more important, an Arctic Council must help secure justice for the region's aboriginal peoples, whose human rights, culture, and way of life have been so devastated by heedless industrialism and the assaults of "modernity" from the South that they are now confronted with the very question of survival. As industrialism leads the planet and all on it toward disaster, it becomes ever more clear that aboriginal peoples, in their respectful tradition of accommodation with Nature, are truly bearers of civilization. There is a real test here. If an Arctic Council fails not only to protect but to enable the aboriginal peoples of the region as they seek a reconciliation of their own cultures with what passes for modernity, the circumpolar countries will have proven themselves collectively incapable of becoming sharing stewards as well as users of their natural environment.

 As to the process goals of an Arctic Council, it follows from what we are saying that empowerment of aboriginal peoples is the key to bringing national governments and southerners to act more responsively in the region. An Arctic Council will be an instrument of civility to the extent that it accords a genuine voice to the indigenous and other peoples of the region. If the most vulnerable of us are able to take part fully in the work of the Council, the interests of all concerned are more likely to be respected. Such an institution will surely be a more responsible one and less the creature of established interests that would brush others aside.

 It is also the case that the aboriginal peoples of the region possess knowledge and experience which is essential to doing things right in this part of the world. The circumpolar governments must now recognize that priorities and practices derived from a temperate existence require substantial adaptation to be successful in the Arctic; otherwise, disappointment and destruction are the results. To incorporate the understanding of aboriginal peoples directly into the work of an Arctic Council is therefore to do considerably more than to begin to redress past injustices. It is to help national governments and the southern majorities they represent become more responsive to northern needs and interests.

An Arctic Council that serves to honour the aboriginal peoples of the region and to give them an authentic voice in its decisions will also complement the current efforts of southerners to secure the sustainable and equitable development of the region. Given the force of industrial and military interests—for example in pulp and paper projects, in hydroelectric development schemes, or in nuclear weapons testing—provision for full participation by aboriginal peoples in an Arctic Council can only serve as a guarantee that the institution will promote the sustainable development of the Arctic. The guarantee here resides in the ability of arctic aboriginal peoples to apprise southern publics and decision makers of the potential consequences of international and internationally significant national action for those who are most immediately affected. Think globally, act locally, the sustainable development slogan rightly proclaims. To get things right locally, there can be no substitute for meaningful local, and thus aboriginal, representation in an international Arctic Council.

The challenge in creating an Arctic Council is therefore not to construct yet another conventional means of intergovernmental co-operation, this time for the north circumpolar region. It is to devise a central arctic institution that innovates in giving new voice to those most heavily affected by decisions currently made by politicians and officials far removed from the consequences of their acts. Not business as usual, but boldness and generosity of purpose are called for as we begin to create a new instrument for comprehensive collaboration in the circumpolar Arctic.

New Beginnings: Setting Up an Arctic Council

IT IS FIRST BY PROMOTING and second by co-ordinating co-operation among the arctic countries that an Arctic Council may ameliorate circumpolar affairs. There is much to be accomplished by an Arctic Council, so much that it should shine with use in the years ahead. But a fully operative institution for circumpolar collaboration will not be created in a single act. Nor, of course, can the full range of arctic social, environmental, human rights, economic, or military problems be attacked all at once. An Arctic Council will evolve from a beginning. To start with, it will have to be fitted into the institutional setting that is taking shape today.

 Emergent Order

 Table 1 presents a sample of the actors and institutions engaged one way or another in the international relations of the Arctic today. No great coherence is to be observed so far in the overall pattern of interaction among regional and extra-regional entities on arctic issues. And yet, an order is beginning to appear in the midst of seeming randomness. Bilateral relationships are being strengthened. New multilateral organizations are being created. The scope and intensity of arctic international relations have unexpectedly reached a point where separated and improvised efforts can only benefit from the services of a central co-ordinating institution. As of spring 1991, a substantial number of arctic and non-arctic actors will soon be committed to the use and success of two pairs of circumpolar institutions.

On the one hand we have the Northern Forum of territorial governments*, launched in Anchorage, Alaska in September 1990, and an arctic aboriginal conference which is to be created in Copenhagen in June 1991. Among the signatories to the Anchorage statement were governors and ministers from Alaska, Alberta, British Columbia, Chukhotka, Greenland, Heilogjiang (China), Hokkaido, the Jewish Autonomous Region (USSR), Lappland (Finland), Magadan, the Northwest Territories, the Russian Republic, Sakhalin, Trondelag (Norway), Vasterbotten (Sweden), and Yukon. Arctic aboriginal peoples will be represented in Copenhagen by the Association of Small Peoples of the Soviet North, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference. and the Nordic Saami Council.

*

The term "territorial" is used in this report to refer to the array of senior sub-national arctic governments reaching from the State of Alaska through the Yukon Territory, the Province of Quebec, and the Home Rule Government of Greenland, to the RSFSR or Russian Republic which embraces 11 time zones and the entire Soviet arctic domain. Not included in this category are regional governments such as the North Slope Borough, Kitikmeot Regional Council, or Sakhalin, which could conceivably band together in a circumpolar forum of their own. As of April 1991, it appears that a regional association of arctic cities and towns may be in the making. If so, it could seek representation in an Arctic Council. As to small indigenous communities, they could be represented in an Arctic Council directly and/or indirectly through national and international aboriginal organizations including the soon-to-be-created arctic aboriginal conference.

 As well, there is the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), which was established in August 1990 at Resolute, Northwest Territories, and the continuing but modest process of arctic environmental co-operation (Rovaniemi II) which is to come in June 1991 from a Finnish initiative made on behalf of a circumpolar environmental accord.

 Each of these endeavours has or will soon have purposes and a life of its own. Participants in each are about to aggregate their diverse purposes into programs of collective action at the local and territorial levels, and on arctic scientific and environmental affairs. Viewed in the ensemble, each pair of forums will soon start to perform limited legislative functions (Arctic Aboriginal Conference and Northern Forum) and executive functions (IASC and Rovaniemi II) for the community of those occupied with arctic matters. But in the absence of a central co-ordinating institution, these efforts will remain disconnected and thus risk falling short of their potential.

For example, aside from dealing with their own internal affairs, arctic territorial and aboriginal forums are each certain to come up with projects that call for a co-ordinated circumpolar effort at the national, territorial, and local levels—for example, to encourage small business, tourism, and trade in the Arctic or to attack the problem of food contamination. How will they put such projects into effect? By consulting with one another, and then separately with the eight arctic states whose officials then will need to engage in ad hoc consultation before responding? Similarly, if full benefit is to be had from purpose-specific arctic international institutions and processes, of which IASC and Rovaniemi II may be only the first, their activities will require a degree of co-ordination. It is well enough for IASC and an impending arctic environmental process to have appeared as it were spontaneously. But how will IASC and Rovaniemi II work together and also take full account of the needs and knowledge of aboriginal peoples and other northerners? If the Arctic Eight wish to consider further circumpolar co-operation, must they launch a new negotiation each time and each time set up a new process of consultation with aboriginal peoples and territorial governments?

 Though circumpolar institution building is in its infancy, it is growing fast. The arctic countries are already in need of a co-ordinating body that brings all relevant players together to identify and act on priority matters. It took some 50 months to complete the negotiations that brought IASC into existence. Not less than 30 months will have elapsed between the Finnish initiative of January 19°o9 and the continued process of arctic environmental co-operation at Rovaniemi in June 1991. Now is indeed the time to begin the process of creating an institution that will enable arctic actors to make the most of their capabilities, including the regional bodies that will likely be in operation by the end of 1991.

TABLE 1 [GOES HERE]

The Centrepiece: How an Arctic Council Would Function

An Arctic Council will capitalize on existing and imminent circumpolar institutions to yield greater productivity in the operations of all concerned. Designed to complement, and not to compete with—certainly not to subordinate—other arctic international bodies or bilateral co-operation between arctic countries, an Arctic Council will help regional actors make the most of multilateral forums at hand. It will do so by providing a focal point for negotiation among parties whose purposes require international co-ordination in excess of that which can be achieved in available institutions and by informal consultation. Beyond co-ordination, an Arctic Council will serve as an instrument for the development of new collaborative ventures through the use of working groups on matters agreed to be of priority concern in the region. Ultimately, an Arctic Council should help the regional countries and interested non-arctic entities to act on circumpolar affairs with a greater sense of shared purpose and direction. Though various alternatives might be considered in specifying the relationship between an Arctic Council and other key arctic international forums, we suggest the architecture shown in Figure 1 as a basis for discussion

As we see it, an Arctic Council should be set up by the Arctic Eight by means of a non-binding agreement which announces the parties' intention to promote and co-ordinate arctic co-operation. The agreement should not require ratification. It could be signed by heads of state at the founding meeting of Council, following a preparatory or founding conference on arctic co-operation attended by parties with a demonstrated interest in the affairs of the region.

 In its international standing and in certain of its procedures, an Arctic Council should in our view share certain attributes of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). A tried and tested international institution that began its work in 1973, the CSCE is now being restructured and may gain enhanced responsibilities in the aftermath of the Cold War. In common with the CSCE, an Arctic Council would centralize the international discussion of regional issues and the identification of projects for joint action. As with the CSCE, the implementation of agreed understandings and commitments would be decentralized, remaining in the hands of the parties whose performance would be subject to public review. And like the CSCE, an international Arctic Council would be an instrument for consensual learning, public diplomacy, and mutual suasion among parties with much business to transact.

But, born into a post-Cold War environment, an Arctic Council would also have characteristics all its own. Whereas the CSCE has been and remains exclusively the instrument of states, an international Arctic Council should be a means of layered and, indeed, laminated co-operation. It should bring together not only the circumpolar states but arctic aboriginal peoples, territorial governments, regional and community representatives, and also non-arctic actors into a circumpolar forum that enables all concerned with the region's affairs to work together. Why should this kind of participation be required? Why not exclude non-arctic actors and include aboriginal peoples and other arctic non-state participants in national delegations? Why not follow the CSCE pattern and constitute a Council as an intergovernmental institution pure and simple?

 The Arctic is in many ways a unique area. It is not well served when priorities and procedures derived from southern political cultures are extended northward. Whereas Europe is now contemplating unification, the Arctic is still segmented into separate zones of national jurisdiction. It is also marginalized and dependent upon external forces in ways quite unknown to continental Europe or North America. More important, the circumpolar region is sparsely populated and bereft of the elaborate social and political structures which in the South stand between the individual and the state. The deficiency here will not be set right by projecting northward a state-centred mode of international co-operation. Nor can non-arctic actors be excluded in view of the dependence of the region on external forces.

 To compensate for the lack of intermediate structure throughout much of the circumpolar Arctic, we need to build aboriginal and territorial participation directly into the workings of a central institution for multilateral co-operation. Some may favour a conventional form of participation, with the inclusion of northerners in national delegations. But northern voices and interests would undoubtedly be submerged, even distorted, by the national agenda. Knowledge vital to the process of learning how to do things right in the Arctic would not be fully expressed. Far better the creativity and inventiveness that are bound to come when northerners are free to speak their minds. Far better the sturdy co-operation that will come with layered interaction and the development of new relationships not only between nation-states, but among aboriginal, territorial, and non-arctic actors.

However, regional actors do vary in the scope of their responsibilities and in their ability to make things happen; this reality will have to be acknowledged in the design of an Arctic Council. Quite simply, the organization will lack the resources to be effective if the interests and requirements of the Arctic Eight are not taken directly into account. Though certainly a departure from the norm in inter-state institutions, an Arctic Council will in the final analysis be an intergovernmental body.

As to the elements of an Arctic Council, it could consist simply of a Council, Working Groups, and a small Secretariat. The Council would gather the parties represented into a circumpolar forum, whose agenda would provide an occasion for general debate on arctic issues with international implications, but would otherwise be fully agreed in advance. Regular meetings would be held in public and be accessible to the media. Council could meet annually, each time in a different arctic country and, as appropriate, in arctic locations. The arctic states would consult prior to, during, and after meetings of Council. So also would aboriginal peoples and territorial governments, utilizing the facilities of an arctic aboriginal conference and the Northern Forum once these are up and running.

 The preparatory conference preceding the formation of an Arctic Council would have agreed on the program of two or more purpose-specific Working Groups, for example, on regional implications of global warming, human resource development, or to discuss arctic military-security requirements to be forwarded for action in extra-regional negotiations. As is the case with IASC, the work of an Arctic Council would be conducted primarily by its Working Groups whose results would be submitted to the Council for discussion and approval. Any member wishing to participate in a Working Group would be entitled to do so; non-arctic actors would be invited to take part on a functional basis as, for example, with UNESCO in a Working Group on human resource development. To justify the commitment to an Arctic Council of additional human resources by northerners themselves, the founding articles of an Arctic Council should oblige the parties to make every effort, given available financial resources, to ensure that the creation of Working Groups responded to priorities identified by aboriginal peoples and territorial governments.

 Finally, a small Secretariat would be required to prepare meetings of Council, to support the work of Working Groups, and to facilitate the exchange of information and experience among participants. Located permanently in an arctic country (possibly in Canada in view of the Canadian government's stated willingness to fund its work), the Secretariat would include individuals nominated by aboriginal peoples and territorial governments as well as the arctic states. English could be the principal working language; provision for interpretation into aboriginal and other languages would be required.

Basic Principles of Panarctic Co-operation

If prior experience of multilateral institution building in the Arctic is any guide, the critical issues in creating an Arctic Council will revolve around (1) the mandate, (2) the rules of participation, (3) the rules of decision-making, and (4) the working agenda of the new body. We have previously discussed the question of mandate, and in the following section of this report we consider the initial agenda of the Council. Here we look at issues of participation and decision making; we anticipate that they will be associated with differences among the arctic countries over the structure of the Council itself. Should the Council take the form of a single plenary body with participation open to a large number of actors and institutions such as are displayed in Table 1 ? Might it be established as a bicameral or two-tiered forum, following the precedent of IASC which consists of a Council and Regional Board? It is not our intention to prescribe answers here. Answers will be discovered in a sharing of views among participants in the preparatory conference that lays the foundation of an Arctic Council. By starting with the identification of principles of panarctic co-operation, the process of discovery may be eased.

Accordingly, we offer the following basic principles to guide the work of an Arctic Council and the preparatory conference:

Structure of an Arctic Council: Four Options

SEVERAL OPTIONS WILL BE AVAILABLE to those who decide on the structure and workings of an Arctic Council. Though we have a preference, we believe that if the basic principles of panarctic co-operation are right, the characteristics of the institution will turn out right. Again, we prefer not to prescribe here, but to contribute to the Canadian and circumpolar discussion of Canada's initiative. In our view there are four main options to be considered.

Option A: Plenary Structure

The first option is to establish an Arctic Council as a plenary body. We will consider the plenary alternative in some detail so as not to repeat ourselves in discussing further options. In a plenary Arctic Council, the principal criteria for participation would be demonstrated arctic interests and a capacity to make an intellectual or material contribution to circumpolar co-operation. The door to participation in this case would be open wide. Participants could be divided into three categories: Founding Parties, Permanent Members, and Members of Council.

The Founding Parties would be the eight arctic states. | They could be given special standing by virtue of their special I responsibilities in the region relative to those of other states, and by virtue of the fact that they command the lion's share of the resources required to fulfil any commitments made by the Council in response to Working Group recommendations.

The category of Permanent Member would be available, exclusively, to aboriginal arctic peoples. In order to account for the realities of both domestic and international law, aboriginal peoples who form enclaves within the arctic states would have to be recognized by the latter for purposes of participation in an Arctic Council. Once such recognition were given, aboriginal peoples so recognized would be entitled to sit individually or collectively as Permanent Members of the institution, to share in the statement of consensus by Council on matters of existential importance to them, and to receive financial resources from arctic states to support their participation. Full use would also be made of the informality that is a hallmark of arctic encounters.

 The third category would be the Members of Council, including all other parties—from the Alaskan hamlet of Kaktovik to the Russian Republic to the Economic Commission for Europe. Members would join in the work of Council in egalitarian fashion, as has occurred, for example, in the Rovaniemi process, where Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) have been ranked together. With the exception of aboriginal peoples' communities and organizations, whose participation would also be funded by the arctic states, Members would take part at their own expense.

 The acts of a plenary Arctic Council would be based primarily on consensus but could include voting. In Council, after all who wished to had said their piece, the consensus (on Working Group projects and recommendations, and, for example, on matters to be referred to IASC and Rovaniemi II) would, with one exception, be stated by the eight arctic states alone, this for reasons that have been made clear. As indicated, the exception would arise on matters of existential importance to Permanent Members; we expect debate on the definition of such matters to be a healthy exercise when and if it should occur. To expedite the proceedings of Working Groups, they might function on the basis of a two-thirds vote of all present, this rule to be made consensually by each group. Concerning agenda setting, aside from a standing provision for general debate on arctic issues with international implications, it could be agreed that the agenda would be determined by majority vote, including the votes of the Founding Parties and, in certain cases, the Permanent Members. Agenda items proposed by Founding Parties, Permanent Members, and Members at least three months before meeting of Council would be circulated by the Secretariat for the necessary approval. Decisions on applications for Member standing would be made in the same way. Should consensus on a given agenda item be lacking among the Eight (and, when required, the Permanent Members), it could be discussed by Council in general debate and possibly proceed, or it could be withdrawn in favour of more promising agenda items.

 The decision procedure considered here is based on the expectation that participants will come to an Arctic Council in order to achieve not only unilateral objectives but also collective gains that could not be had in the absence of an institution bringing all key actors together on matters of mutual concern.

 Among the Arctic Eight, post-Cold War differences should not prove such that any Founding Party would expect to be put in the position of casting a veto. The United States, for example, could count on the support of other arctic NATO states on any major matter to which it took exception. Similarly, the Soviet Union would not be forced to the wall on a proposition which it found objectionable. The Arctic Eight would instead act together to protect potential gains on issues where agreement was within reach.

Substantial opportunities accorded aboriginal peoples and other arctic non-state actors in decisions on the membership and agenda of the Council, and in the work of Working Groups, would be counterbalanced by the authority of the Arctic Eight to state the consensus of Council and to act on the formation and recommendations of Working Groups. Given the access of the media to meetings of Council, all participants would nevertheless be subject to public and private suasion. In the midst of it all, the northern voice would be heard. And while aboriginal peoples in particular would be empowered, they would share power directly with states in a plenary Arctic Council only on issues deemed to be of existential significance to them.

 Compromise and anticipation of the preferences of others should thus be the order of the day among participants, nonarctic entities included, who would have more than enough in common to avoid stalemate in the work of a plenary Arctic Council.

 Option B: Bicameral Structure

 Second, we have the option of a two-tiered or bicameral structure consisting of the arctic (and possibly interested non-arctic) states on the one hand, and a gathering of non-state actors on the other. Though such an arrangement might appeal to southern decision-makers, especially those whose national experience is one of bicameral government, it could relegate non-state participants, including aboriginal peoples and other northerners, to a secondary or an observer's role in the Council's affairs. And if the second tier were not merely to observe the work of the first, the reconciliation of preferences and priorities between the two chambers in dealing with Working Group projects and other matters could prove cumbersome. We would also add that, whereas a plenary Arctic Council could serve as an instrument to raise broadly based public support for panarctic co-operation, a bicameral Council, in which the states sat apart from other participants, would be unlikely to go far in evoking southern awareness and political will to achieve greater civility in the life of the Arctic.

 Option C: Compact Structure

 Third, we envisage an alternative which allows for what may be called compact representation. In this option, an Arctic Council would consist of ten delegations, acting on the basis of consensus. The arctic states would account for eight delegations. A ninth, represented by the arctic aboriginal conference, would speak for the region's indigenous peoples. A tenth delegation, forwarded by the Northern Forum, would speak for the Arctic's territorial governments. Aboriginal home rule governments would be a special case here, able to choose their form of representation. Non-arctic states—for example, Germany, Japan, Poland, and the United Kingdom—could also be invited individually to attend as observers with the right to speak in Council as they do in the Rovaniemi process. Together with arctic states and arctic non-state entities, non-arctic states and non-state actors would be invited to participate in the work of Arctic Council Working Groups as appropriate.

The option of a compact Arctic Council offers an efficient means of ensuring that the northern voice is heard while at the same time keeping the human resources, interaction, and financial costs of participation to a minimum. Aboriginal peoples and other northerners would in particular be independently represented in the all-important heads-of-delegation meetings that would be held in private to steer the work of Council. The compact option would also make good use of an arctic aboriginal conference and the Northern Forum in aggregating the preferences of what could otherwise be seen as a large and unwieldy gathering of delegations to a central circumpolar institution. Symbolically, the presence of aboriginal peoples and other northerners at the table, with media present, should serve to elicit greater public awareness of arctic affairs and willingness to fund collective arctic action from southern metropolitan centres. In practical terms, their presence as full and equal participants would ensure that northern needs were well and truly met, that collective action was informed with northern understanding.

 Time may be required for diverse arctic aboriginal peoples on the one hand, and territorial governments on the other, to achieve a meeting of minds sufficient to entrust representation to a small delegation in each case. Depending on how quickly negotiations go in establishing a Council, it could therefore be necessary for nationals from these two constituencies to secure direct representation as well on the delegations of the Eight.

Option D: Tripartite Delegation Structure

Finally, let us suppose that the cautiousness of the arctic states is such that nothing better can be achieved than an Arctic Council consisting of eight fully empowered national delegations and a set of participant observers present by invitation only. In these unpromising circumstances, the aboriginal peoples of the Arctic and other northerners would be faced with the choice of opposing such an institution, or of separately finding ways to guarantee their participation on national delegations and the inclusion of essential issues on the agenda. It is our assumption that, in an Arctic Council based on national delegations, the national, and hence the southern interest and awareness, will prevail with all the consequences that can be anticipated. Let us nevertheless consider what might be accomplished under such conditions.

 In the tripartite delegation option, fairly large national delegations would consist of representatives from (l ) central governments, (2) aboriginal peoples, and (3) northern sub-national governments. Depending on the preferences of individual arctic states, each delegation would have its own internal decision rules ranging in principle from consensus to final determination by the central government alone. It could, however, be understood, but not formally required, that nationals with extensive northern experience, or northerners themselves as distinct from southern officials, would be appointed as heads of delegation. In any event, final acts of the Council would be achieved by consensus among eight parties. This being essentially a state-centric conception of panarctic co-operation, non-arctic states and the new entity that is to represent a United Europe after 1992 could have participant observer status in the proceedings of the Council. Similar standing might also be given to international arctic aboriginal organizations as has occurred in the Rovaniemi process to date.

 On the other hand, and to offset the influence of southern majorities, provision could be made for each of the three constituencies represented in national delegations to caucus separately. Aboriginal people from the eight delegations

 (actually seven, as Iceland has no aboriginal population) would thus meet to share information and co-ordinate preferences on matters under consideration by the parties to an Arctic Council. So also would the representatives of territorial and national governments respectively. The effect here might begin to approximate what we have termed laminated co-operation: the force of national governments in shaping the work of an Arctic Council could actively be conditioned by the shared understandings and interests of indigenous and other northern representatives which would be carried back into individual delegations. Needless to say, the arctic state governments would have to consult domestically with aboriginal peoples and territorial governments, who themselves would decide who was to represent them in national delegations. Otherwise the tripartite option, problematic to begin with, would offer no real alternative to conventional decision making by the centre.

A Preference

At this early stage in the process of building an Arctic Council, we are inclined to favour the third, or compact, option in resolving foreseeable issues of participation and decision. In stating this preference, we are especially mindful of one set of concerns that was brought home to us time and again in our northern consultations. The concern here stems from the fact that not only in Canada but throughout the circumpolar Arctic, aboriginal organizations and communities are already stretched to the limit in preparing for, staffing, and following through on the work of local, regional, territorial, national, and international bodies and negotiations. The same applies in lesser measure at the level of territorial governments and even the nation-state. It follows that if a new institution for panarctic collaboration is to operate effectively, costs of participation in yet another set of operations—this time in the Council and Working Groups of an Arctic Council—must be kept low relative to the benefits of co-operation. Participation costs are likely to be lowest in the case of a compact Arctic Council, which should at the same time go far in ensuring direct representation of aboriginal and other northern peoples on behalf of greater civility in circumpolar affairs. We thus opt for a compact Arctic Council as yielding net arctic benefits superior to those currently available through unilateral effort or ad hoc bilateral and multilateral action. Should the compact option prove unacceptable for whatever reason, we would support the plenary alternative.

We recognize that our thinking here, as on other matters considered in this report, will strike some as unconventional. This will be especially true for those from circumpolar countries whose aboriginal peoples and territorial governments are less prominent on the national scene than is the case in Canada. We are nevertheless convinced that conventional processes and structures of decision making must yield in the Arctic to innovative forms of collective action adapted to the special circumstances of the region.

 Initial Agenda of an Arctic Council

 BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATION in an Arctic Council will come in a variety of ways. They will be found in (1) an exchange of experience and information on domestic problems common to the arctic countries, (2) the establishment of circumpolar standards in handling transboundary issues, (3) a pooling of effort and resources to counter the region's dependence on external forces, (4) the co-ordination of purpose-specific arctic institutions and processes, and (5) the simple efficiencies of a central forum. The net result of collective action in the framework of an Arctic Council should thus be to reduce substantially the operating costs of individual arctic actors as they deal with priority matters under conditions of resource scarcity.

And yet initial outlays of resources could be significant in conducting a preparatory conference, and during the first year or so of an Arctic Council's work, before tangible benefits are secured. Much will therefore depend on the agenda initially selected for the Council and its Working Groups. Also significant will be provisions made in the founding articles of an Arctic Council to assist those least able to bear the costs of participation.

 As with the structure of an Arctic Council, its agenda will need to be cast with an eye to initiatives already under way, acknowledging that some issues might more properly be dealt with by other means. Matters best handled on a bilateral or subregional basis—for example, Alaska-Yukon transboundary issues or the abatement of airborne pollution of Nordic lands from the Kola Peninsula—will presumably continue to be addressed without direct reference to an Arctic Council. So also will certain matters, some of them possibly controversial, that states may prefer to regard as falling exclusively within their domestic jurisdiction, for example, Hydro-Quebec's James Bay II megaproject. It is also reasonable to expect that the consideration of scientific matters in the Arctic will be centred on IASC, and need not find any large place on the agenda of an Arctic Council.

The arctic environment, however, is a different matter and should figure heavily in the work of an Arctic Council. The circumpolar peoples will expect no less. As well, all indications suggest that Rovaniemi II will be so weakly institutionalized that environmental issues would be better subsumed into the agenda of an Arctic Council which may, in turn, serve to energize the Rovaniemi process on specific issues.

Finally, there is the vexed question of arctic military operations. Currently, the arctic states are unanimous in tacit opposition to negotiations among arctic states on confidence-building and arms control measures affecting the region, and would see all such issues treated in non-arctic negotiating forums only. At the same time, aboriginal peoples, territorial governments, not a few people to the South, and now possibly an alliance of arctic municipalities are all likely to prefer an Arctic Council with a mandate to address circumpolar military matters. Clearly there is a gap to be bridged here.

 What then do these various considerations leave us with in specifying the initial agenda of an Arctic Council? The short answer is plenty. The long answer is summarized in Table 2, which gathers a representative sample of questions that could find their way onto the agenda of an Arctic Council.

 Many matters that come before an Arctic Council will have a non-military character. Indeed, it seems safe to say that the bulk of its effort will be concerned with environmental, social, and economic affairs. But some of the Council's work will deal eventually with questions of international peace and security, if the institution is to be an uncompromised instrument for civility in arctic international affairs. Part of the agenda will be concerned with what may be termed arctic-external problems, in that they originate outside the region and require co-operation with non-regional actors either in extra-regional negotiating forums or in the Council framework itself. However, most problems will be arctic specific in that they originate within the region and can be resolved by the circumpolar countries acting alone. Some problems will entail long-term action; others, more likely arctic-specific in nature, may be acted upon in relatively short order so as to demonstrate that an Arctic Council can make a difference.

Important decisions will thus be made in determining the initial agenda of the Council. If it is to get off to a good start, these decisions will very largely have been taken by the preparatory conference that generates the new institution. For our part, we have no wish to discuss these matters in detail. And yet we do have views which we believe should be considered in the Canadian and international discussion of a truly effective and responsive Arctic Council.

From the outset we require an assurance that problems selected for action by the Working Groups will be chosen to meet the aspirations of aboriginal peoples and other northerners as they define them. There can be no thought of attuning the activity of Working Groups first to the priorities of southern centres, and promising that items on the aboriginal agenda will be dealt with later on. The initial selection of two or three different projects for multilateral action in Working Groups must deal with northern as well as southern or national needs from the start. The parties to a preparatory conference will be well advised not to be too ambitious to begin with, and to concentrate on only a few most pressing issues, including those where benefits can soon be demonstrated.

Second, multilateral and national action undertaken by the arctic states in response to recommendations of the Working Groups will have to be funded without prejudice to pre-existing financial support provided by these states to their aboriginal peoples. By the same token, financial assistance over and above existing support will need to be extended by the arctic states to permit aboriginal NGOs, regional governments, and small communities to take part in the work of Working Groups. There can be no giving with one hand and taking with the other if an Arctic Council is to I respond to the situation of those most directly affected by panarctic co-operation and the lack thereof.

 Third, and as we have noted in passing, the proceedings of Council will need to allow for general debate in which any matter of arctic international significance may be raised for discussion. Needless to say, this right would be open to all members. We do however distinguish between the discussion and the negotiation of issues in Council: negotiation would be entered into and conducted on the basis of consensus; discussion would serve to place controversial matters on the table as a first step toward consensus and expansion of Council tasks.

 By way of illustration on this point—and bearing in mind that proceedings of Council would be accessible to the media— aboriginal peoples and other northerners would be in a position to contest human rights violations, low-level flight training, or nuclear-weapons testing in the Arctic. Though consensus on such matters may be unavailable to begin with, northern voices would have been heard in the Council and to the South. In due course, an Arctic Council could proceed from discussion to negotiation on certain controversial issues. Negotiation could occur directly in Council, and produce common undertakings to be implemented by parties individually and then reviewed collectively at subsequent sessions. Or issues could be passed to Working Groups for the development of recommendations to Council.

Finally, and most important, we urge that the mandate of an Arctic Council be an open one that allows for growth in the Council's agenda with the growth of consensus. No international arctic matter should in principle be barred from discussion or negotiation in Council. This applies to questions of international peace and security. Though consensus procedures will prevail on this as on other questions, an Arctic Council must be able to address issues of peace and security as circumstances allow. There is a way around the obvious problem here. It relies again on the distinction between discussion and negotiation.

 As is noted in a Canadian government background paper of January 1991 on arctic security:

 The Soviet Union has indicated that it too believes that arctic security is best dealt with in an East-West context. Although they have offered to discuss arctic-based nuclear weapons in circumpolar forums, the Soviets are adamant that reduction of these weapons can take place only in the context of strategic nuclear arms talks between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Canada agrees with this approach. *

* We also agree with this approach as a point of departure in forming the mandate of an Arctic Council. Just as the Government of Canada has discussed but not negotiated with the Soviet Union on the matter of Soviet nuclear-weapons testing in the Arctic, the proceedings of an Arctic Council should from the outset permit discussion of the region's military affairs without committing the parties to negotiation.

Origins and Solutions Arctic Problems: Exchange of Experience, Joint Action, Standardization of Performance

Arctic-specific Aboriginal self-determination; arts and cultural exchange; cessation of low-level flight training; cessation

of "tickler" flights by strategic bombers; codification and dissemination of aboriginal traditional science;

co-operatives; creation of a central arctic data bank; cold regions technology development and transfer,

education; environmental impact assessment procedures and techniques; fisheries research and

management; regionally generated food contamination; habitat protection; health services delivery;

housing; human resource development; hydrocarbon, hard mineral and other megaprojects; land-use

planning; marine transportation; oil spill clean-up in arctic waters; parks creation; prohibition of

amphibious landing exercises; removal of hazardous materials from active and decommissioned military

sites; remote sensing; search and rescue; sewage disposal and water management; small business

development; tourism; violation of aboriginal and other human rights; weather and ice forecasting; wildlife

management and co-management.

Arctic-external Amendment of international legal instruments to meet arctic requirements; arctic business cycle and

counter-cyclical action; attack submarine limits; cruise missile testing; depressed fur prices;

establishment of demilitarized zones; food contamination; high-latitude effects of global warming;

long-range airborne and oceanic transport of pollutants; military data exchanges; naval deployment and

exercise limitations; nuclear weapons testing; nuclear weapons reductions.

Discussion and negotiation can be kept apart until the growth of confidence among the arctic states, and hence consensus in an Arctic Council, are such as to permit negotiation in the Council on regional military questions. Part-way in the emergence of consensus, Council could find itself in a position to affirm a common perspective on one or more arctic security problems—for instance on matters of military confidence building—which could then be carried forward by the Eight into the relevant extra-regional arms control talks for negotiation there.

 The parties to an Arctic Council should be in a position to deal with the full array of circumpolar military and civil matters, as consensus allows. The exclusion of military matters from the mandate of an Arctic Council would imply acquiescence in discriminatory and prejudicial military uses of the arctic relative to other regions closer to "home." It would underwrite the continued marginalization of a region that needs to be brought home in the mind's eye of southern majorities and their governments. And by lending authority to the value of an opposed-forces outlook on the Arctic, the exemption of security questions would not help and could well hinder circumpolar co-operation on civil issues.

 It is furthermore the case that in proscribing military strategic discussion, the arctic states would do violence to the inherent interrelatedness of circumpolar issues. Is not the removal of toxic materials from military sites around the region an environmental and also a human rights issue? Does not the same apply to low-level flight training, and to the testing of nuclear weapons? Should we be prevented from considering the use of a small number of decommissioned U.S. and Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarines as platforms to monitor critical arctic processes of global warming and the oceanic transport of pollutants? These and other disabilities would result from a refusal of the Eight to endow an Arctic Council with a comprehensive mandate.

Founding Articles of an Arctic Council

To SUMMARIZE OUR THINKING on the agenda of an Arctic Council and to prompt discussion of provisions ensuring that participation is cost-effective for those least able to afford it, we propose the following as draft Founding Articles:

The Way Ahead

IN ANNOUNCING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL initiative on 28 November 1990, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs undertook to raise the proposal at the Rovaniemi ministerial meeting which is to conclude an arctic environmental accord, and which is now set to take place 13-14 June 1991. He also stated that, "The agenda of an Arctic Council should be flexible, allowing for growth with success, as confidence grows. In addition the Government believes that it is crucial that an Arctic Council allow the voice of Northern peoples to be heard so that they may contribute to decisions affecting their lives and interests." All of this is promising.

 From here, the government needs first to include Canadians, above all Canada's aboriginal peoples, in the formation of its negotiating position on an Arctic Council. The creation of an Arctic Council must from the start be an exercise in public diplomacy if it is to be done right.

Second, Canadians need a clear idea of the steps and stages in the process of creating an Arctic Council. As we see the sequence, it could extend to some six steps, as follows: (1) informal exchange of views among the Eight, to June 1991; (2) initial formal exchange of views, as already announced, at Rovaniemi, mid-June 1991; (3) preliminary negotiations among the Eight to determine basic characteristics of an Arctic Council and the negotiation that will produce it, June-December 1991; (4) preparatory conference, possibly in two stages, spring and autumn 1992; (5) founding meeting at arctic heads-of-state level to sign Founding Articles and Basic Principles, and to authorize Working Groups as recommended by the preparatory conference, spring 1993; and (6) first regular Arctic Council meeting, spring 1994. Unless this sequence is accelerated, some 40 months will have elapsed between Canada's initial statement of intent and the first business meeting of an Arctic Council. We therefore urge the government of Canada to do its utmost to speed the process while taking due account of the readiness of others to move forward.

Third, the Rovaniemi meeting in June 1991 promises to be a test of Canadian leadership in securing a go-ahead for preliminary negotiations among the Eight on the nature of this new institution and the process that will bring it into being. Ottawa will presumably produce an options paper in order to make broadly clear what is intended and what expertise and interests might be included in delegations to a preparatory negotiation. In so doing, the government must immediately engage in vigorous, substantive consultation with interested Canadians; it must put itself in a position to demonstrate to other arctic states that it has significant domestic support for its approach to an Arctic Council.

 Fourth, if (as we believe) a preparatory conference which includes a variety of arctic non-state actors is a necessary step in the process, it follows that the criteria used by the Eight in issuing invitations will be very important. Convinced as we are that a national delegations approach to non-state representation is inadequate, we recommend that the Canadian government seek support for a preparatory conference in the form of a plenary gathering with broad and vigorous non-state representation. We regard it as essential that aboriginal organizations be invited themselves to nominate their representatives to a preparatory conference. While recognizing that traditions and circumstances will vary among arctic states as they consider and enter into national consultations on non-state participation, we further urge that Canada seek agreement that expenses be defrayed by the arctic states for aboriginal organizations and communities wishing to intervene.

 Fifth, there is the question of the decision rules to be employed in a preparatory conference. On this point we recommend that Canada seek the assent of the Eight that they will state the consensus of the gathering with one exception. As already indicated, the exception would arise when issues were being decided that affected the existential interests of aboriginal people. In a preparatory conference, the aboriginal interest in such matters could be stated by a simple majority of indigenous participants.

 So let us do it, and let us do it right. Let us not only create an international Arctic Council, but do so in a way that energizes the circumpolar countries to co-operate for the benefit of arctic regions and their inhabitants.

 The Arctic Council Panel is composed of Franklyn Griffiths, Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto (cochair); Rosemarie Kuptana, President, Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (co-chair); John Amagoalik, former president, Inuit Tapirisat of Canada; William Erasmus, President, Dene Nation; Cindy Gilday, formerly of Indigenous Survival International; Stephen Hazell, Executive Director, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee; John Lamb, Executive Director, Arms Control Centre; and Mary Simon, President, Inuit Circumpolar Conference.

 The work of the Arctic Council Panel has been supported by the Walter and Duncan Gordon Charitable Foundation.