by John Skogan
THE CANADIAN PROPOSAL for the establishment of an International Arctic Council is a commendable initiative. Co-operation across national borders in the Arctic has been increasing in recent years. On the non-governmental level, contacts among arctic-oriented groups in different countries of the region have intensified, in some cases resulting in the establishment of new circumpolar associations and forums. Co-operation on arctic, or arctic-related issues, has also increased at the governmental level. But until now such co-operation has been almost exclusively bilateral in nature. There seems, however, to be ample room and good reasons for expanding governmental co-operation on arctic issues into the establishment of a multilateral forum involving all countries of the region.
The opportunities for expanded co-operation are much improved with the ending of the Cold War. Not only has the easing of East-West relations improved the climate for regional co-operation in the Arctic and elsewhere; it has also removed, or lessened, former obstacles due to military considerations. The establishment last year, with governmental consent, of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) is a case in point. Its establishment had been on the international agenda for several years but was held up, it seems, by security concerns. Now that the Cold War is history, such considerations are likely to prove less of an impediment to arctic co-operation. Due to a combination of geography and technology, the military significance of the Arctic will probably still remain. But some of the related, habitual caution of the Cold War years is likely to vanish.
Improved opportunities for governmental co-operation on arctic issues coincide with a greater awareness of the need to address regional problems which do not respect national jurisdictions. Prominent among these are problems of environmental protection which in most cases defy strategies based on unilateral state action and demand multilateral, inter-state collaboration. This is the idea behind the "Rovaniemi process", initiated in 1989 by the Finish ministers of Foreign Affairs and Environment and aimed at protection of the arctic environment through governmental co-operation. A ministerial meeting held in June of this year was the first circumpolar meeting on such a level to address regional problems and challenges.
Given that conditions are in many respects similar throughout the region, the arctic states are also facing common problems in other fields. For example, climate and remoteness give rise to special problems of resource exploitation, communication, and transportation; and all states (with the exception of Iceland) include aboriginal communities whose concerns are special in a national context but in many ways identical from country to country. So, too, are the consequent challenges to their governments.
In view of the common interest in finding an answer to such problems and challenges it would seem profitable for the arctic countries to extend circumpolar consultations and cooperation beyond the field of environmental protection. In some fields they may gain from pooling resources and seeking common solutions to common problems. In other fields they may profit from harmonizing approaches to identical problems, or simply from the sharing of information and experiences.
Many of the tasks and problems faced in the Arctic require co-ordination at the governmental level. For example, problems of resource exploitation due to climatic conditions are related to environmental concerns which arise from the fragility of the arctic ecosystem. Moreover, the ability to tackle such challenges will depend, among other things, on programs in the field of scientific exploration and research. It is, therefore, quite conceivable that the Rovaniemi discussions will move well beyond purely environmental issues. For example, the potential for oil spills in the Arctic is necessarily linked to oil extraction activity and transportation. Accordingly, regulations in order to prevent such spillage will mean regulation imposed on extraction and transportation. and must be considered in that context as well.
The Rovaniemi process may also convince governments involved of the benefits to be reaped through circumpolar consultations and collaboration on other (i.e., non-environmental) regional matters. If so, the process may become an incentive to, or even serve as the basis for, the establishment of an intergovernmental arctic council for the purpose of addressing a wider range of regional questions.
The advantages of having available a multilateral forum for circumpolar contacts and collaboration should not, however, blind us to its limitations. And there are several. First, an arctic council need not address every issue relating to the Arctic in a multilateral context. Circumpolar co-operation should not be approached as an aim in itself. It can serve as an instrument. Its usefulness as such will depend on the nature of the issues and challenges at hand and the interests of the nations concerned. And it will depend on the alternatives.
Several bilateral frameworks for negotiation and collaboration on arctic issues have already been established. These have functioned, more or less, to the full satisfaction of the parties involved. Such bilateral arrangements need no replacement. Neither is full circumpolar involvement necessary if a particular problem can be successfully managed on a bilateral basis. Besides, involving more parties and new interests may run the risk of further complicating matters. Therefore, even when a regional problem proves difficult to handle on a bilateral basis it will not necessarily become more manageable if submitted to a body of full circumpolar participation. Whether it is likely to or not has to be judged on the basis of the merits of each particular problem.
Nor are all the problems and challenges of the Arctic most expediently approached in a context which is exclusively regional. The countries of the region may choose to address certain of their problems and challenges with other, non-arctic countries. For instance, preventing further depletion of the polar ozone layer requires the co-operation of more than polar countries. A shared interest in doing so has so far led a great number of industrialized countries to ratify the Montreal Protocol on reductions in the emissions of ozone-depleting substances. To take another example, IASC includes several non-arctic countries, undoubtedly to the advantage of arctic research and presumably to the benefit of the regional countries.
Circumpolar co-operation should not be promoted in competition with, or to the displacement of, arctic-related frameworks of co-operation and commitment involving non-regional countries. By and large, the activity carried out within such frameworks serves both the region and its constituent states. Duplicating it in a circumpolar context is not only unnecessary, but may also limit the interest and contributions of non-arctic states. Such a development would in general serve neither the Arctic as a region nor the interest of the arctic states.
Circumpolar co-operation may complement extra-regional co-operation on arctic matters, and it may do so in ways for which there is no dependable alternative. But enhanced circumpolar co-operation as an instrument for that purpose should, nevertheless, be balanced off against the utility and the necessity of having non-regional countries on board in the tackling of problems and challenges of the Arctic.
Furthermore, the prospect of circumpolar co-operation is probably better served by realizing that some issues relating to the Arctic are neither seen nor addressed as "arctic" issues by all countries concerned—and for good reason. For example, most military issues relating to the Arctic are functionally linked to important non-arctic contexts. Trying to make such issues the subject of circumpolar consultation and negotiation with the aim of producing a regional resolution is not likely to succeed; too much is at stake for everyone in the non-regional contexts. As well, such attempts are more likely to restrain interest in schemes of general circumpolar co-operation. To the extent that it is possible to have military questions submitted to a circumpolar agenda, it is likely that such issues would be in the process of being resolved in a non-arctic context, without the assistance of the circumpolar forum.
Finally, in promoting circumpolar co-operation it is advisable to keep in mind that similarities throughout the Arctic are mixed with differences within the region. Differences with respect to history and traditions, to legal and military matters, and to relations with neighbouring countries also play a part in producing different perspectives on arctic problems among the circumpolar countries. In addition, the Arctic, as well as arctic policies, serve different purposes in different countries. In the European countries of the region the Arctic does not rank high on the public policy agenda. For the moment, at least, the attention of some is strongly drawn in the opposite direction, toward developments in central Europe and toward the European community.
Even so, expanding institutionalized circumpolar cooperation at the governmental level beyond environmental issues is likely to serve both the Arctic and the countries of the region. But there are, for good and bad reasons, many limitations on the agenda for such co-operation. Pressing for too much in this respect, and thus challenging legitimate and effective mechanisms for co-operation at the international level, may backfire. The Arctic deserves better.
John Skogan is a former Norwegian minister of defence. He is currently working with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.