Two different sets of aspirations have been on a collision course for some years. One is largely Pakeha; the other largely Maori. The first is embarked on a search for symbols of national identity and cohesion and looks to events where these can be expressed. The second is pursuing a fight to have the treaty recognized by government in ways that acknowledge the Maori understanding of the agreement. Waitangi Day and Waitangi itself provide the focus for both sets of aspirations—one charged with an emotional need to celebrate (or, at the very least, to commemorate peacefully), the other with an urgency to be heeded. Conflict is inevitable.
This could have been foreseen in 1932 when GovernorGeneral Lord Bledisloe donated the Waitangi property to the nation. In 1934 the first commemorative event was held there, and Bledisloe composed a prayer that became the accepted expression of of ficial sentiment for some fifty years: "the sacred compact made in these waters may be faithfully and honourably kept for all time to come." Most New Zealanders no doubt had the impression that the terms of the treaty had been satisfied, even if few had actually read it. Public awareness of its terms and its making had been minimal since the 1870s. In 1890 its fiftieth anniversary had passed almost unnoticed.
The Maori viewpoint was markedly different. From 1840, the treaty had been the basis for gauging their relationship first with the Crown and later with the New Zealand government. Unsatisfied with that relationship, they had pursued various courses in seeking redress, with little success. To them, Waitangi and the treaty were indeed symbols of nationhood but for reasons other than those generally held by the New Zealand public. In 1834 northern tribes had gathered at Waitangi to choose a national flag, and the next year, as the Confederation of United Tribes, had issued a declaration of the country' s independence that Britain recognized and accepted. A great hui (gathering) at Waitangi in 1934 marked the centenary of these events. as well as Bledisloe' s gift.
He iwi tahi tatou
For the 1940 centennial of the treaty's signing the government chose to mount a great display of national pride and unity at an event in Waitangi. The country' s newspapers headlined fitting expressions: Waitangi was the "cradle of the nation"; the treaty was the Maori "Magna Carta" and the "foundation of nationhood." Dissenting Maori voices went largely unnoticed. Nurtured in the public consciousness was the belief that the treaty had secured British sovereignty, that British colonization had been a civilizing mission, and that the Maori—more shrewd and more capable than other indigenous races—had wisely grasped that benevolent hand and had benefited. The aspiration voiced by William Hobson, the British consul who secured the treaty, became entrenched as both ideal and perceived reality: He iwi tahi tatou (We are now one people).
The Second World War gave this cry the semblance of substance as the country united in a major war effort with a substantial Maori component. After the war, Waitangi ceremonies set into a pattern that was to last to the 1980s. Each year of ficial speeches stressed the legendary good relations said to exist between Maori and Pakeha. Speakers either were ignorant of historical grievances and current impediments affecting Maori communities or chose to ignore them. But Maori were not prepared to be silent, and in the 1970s and 1980s, as television and radio broadcasts carried Waitangi events to the nation, protest became a strategy in Maori efforts to influence government policy and public opinion.
|
|
Unaware of the extent of divergence between Maori and Pakeha views of the treaty and of the of ficial record in failing to honour its terms, many New Zealanders were shocked or incensed by what seemed like Maori ingratitude or, even worse, a lack of comrnitment to building a unified national identity, a rejection of the one people aspiration, and a disquieting departure towards separatism (often equated irrationally with apartheid). Although such views would long survive, the assumptions on which they were based were soon challenged.
The perceptions of many New Zealanders were radically altered by information on the treaty and on New Zealand history that began to emerge from academic research and writing in the 1970s. Until then, most writers had emphasized the humanitarian concern in the treaty negotiations rather than how the treaty was used to serve British and settler interests. Moreover, the few who had read the treaty would almost certainly have looked at the English text. That there was also a Maori text of paramount importance was generally not known. More than 500 Maori leaders had signed the Maori text; only 39 had signed the English text. The essential differences between the texts provide insight into Maori understanding and show why there is a divergence of Maori and Pakeha opinion on what the treaty promised and what it now means.
English-Maori Texts
The treaty has three articles. In the English text, the first records the cession of sovereignty to Queen Victoria. In the second, the Maori people, collectively and individually, are confirmed in the "possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries, and other properties." The third article extends protection and imparts "all the rights and privileges of British subjects." In the Maori text, however, the first article gives the Queen simply "te kawanatanga katoa," the right to govern and to make laws. The second confirms that Maori will retain "te tino rangatiratanga," chiefly power or the right to possess and exercise control over lands, villages, and valued property of all kinds. The third promises crown protection and the same rights and duties of citizenship as British subjects. By this understanding, neither the Crown nor the Maori have absolute rights; each has conceded authority and rights to the other.
The divergence of aspirations in the two texts is clear: The Crown sought sovereignty over a country that Britain had previously recognized as independent. Hobson assumed he had secured it and was not going to be deterred from proclaiming so before several copies of the agreement had travelled the country and despite its rejection by a number of Maori leaders. He was prepared to make concessions to get agreement. But neither he, his translators, nor the interpreters of the agreement (mainly English missionaries) at some fifty meetings were disinterested parties. They were bound to emphasize what a boon the treaty would be and to play down the implications of British colonization.
Maori made their decision on the basis of the Maori text. They wanted regulated settlement, trade, and income from employment, and they needed support in controlling land sales. The new partnership would also enable them to avoid the inter-tribal warfare that had escalated in previous decades. Although aware that they would have to make concessions to a colonial administration to allow it to exercise power, Maori leaders were assured by of ficials that their own authority was left in place by the second article (in Maori). This suggested that a shared authority would evolve and would be enhanced, to Maori advantage, by other treaty articles. But Maori were suspicious of the Crown's intentions, and their fears were confirmed as the young colony developed its administrative infrastructure. While goodwill and a desire to honour the treaty were not absent from early government dealings with tribal groups, the first two decades after 1840 showed that the treaty would be interpreted largely on the basis of the English text and that the government could choose to ignore the treaty. Statements by government agents—that the treaty gave protection and guarantees—were in conflict with official practice in law and land issues.
|
We want to build a social and political consensus on the settlement of Treaty grievances so New Zealanders will soon be able to put the injustices of the past behind them. We will then be in a better position to fulfil the positive intentions inherent in the Treaty of Waitangi. Hon. D. A. M. Graham |
Paper Entitlement
Although the treaty gave settlement a relatively easy ride by providing a paper entitlement to the country, it was the substance of power and authority that a colonial legislature, set up in the 1850s, sought. Moreover, the legislature did not intend to share such authority with Maori leaders, especially in the Waikato, where leadership had adopted the title of king with an objective of withholding land from sale. Fighting over land commenced in Taranaki in 1860. The 1863 invasion of the Waikato by British troops and the escalation of warfare to the Bay of Plenty and other areas was officially labelled as a move against rebellion, on the basis of the third article of the treaty. In elfect, it was a war to assert British supremacy and it was increasingly fought by colonials as British troops withdrew.
Government confiscation of Maori land in the Waikato, Taranaki, the Bay of Plenty, and Hawke's Bay grievously undermined Maori economic resources in those areas, leaving a legacy of bitterness. It also affected Maori who had fought on the government side as well as Maori elsewhere, since the government's actions called into question all Maori rights. So too did legislative provision to free Maori land for sale and settlement by clearing its title through land court investigation. Tribal groups were often enticed into selling by underhand methods. The collective interests of a tribe or hapu (sub-tribe) were undermined by the individualization of land interests, making land easier to sell. A series of legislative enactments and amendments through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries continued to provide the structures for separating Maori
from their lands . By the 1870s the South Island had been almost completely alienated; by the early 1890s, about two thirds of the North Island.
As land loss struck hard in the 1870s Maori debated treaty promises at numerous conferences. Land, law, and authority were the issues. The inroads on the treaty's fishing rights through the expansion of settlement—rights less defined and easier to lose—were also noted. Various strategies were adopted in an effort to stem the tide and regain control of Maori affairs. Several deputations (in 1882, 1884, 1914, and 1924) appealed unsuccessfully to the British Crown and government—the 1840 treaty-makers—to intervene on Maori behalf. The New Zealand Parliament, responsible for internal affairs since the 1860s, denied breach of treaty terms and clearly had no intention of assuming responsibility for upholding the treaty as Maori understood it. Nor could four Maori members of Parliament, allowed after 1867, exert influence on the floor of a house dominated by settler politicians.
The Kotahitanga
Other options were tried. In the 1890s a pan-tribal Maori parliament—the Kotahitanga—hoped that a unified Maori voice might be heeded by the national Parliament. But the Kotahitanga was easily ignored, for the Maori people numbered fewer than 50,000 in a total population that rose to more than 800,000 in 1900. (In a recent estimate, the Maori population in 1840 numbered, at most, 90,000 against 2,000 Europeans.) Earlier predictions that the Maori were a dying race appeared to be correct. A well-established pattern of socio-economic disadvantage was evident in most of the tribal areas, where the people, mainly rural, were existing generally at subsistence level. And yet the cultural richness of the Maori world remained intact, supported in part by a continuity of leadership, in part by an educated elite who were now participating comfortably in both Maori and Pakeha communities.
Representatives of that elite played a significant role in bridging the two worlds as the Maori population began to expand in the first decades of the twentieth century. Most prominent was Apirana Ngata, MP for Eastern Maori from 1905 to 1943, who initiated government-funded development schemes for Maori land and the consolidation of land holdings into viable economic units. For the 1940 centenary, Ngata shrewdly encouraged the building of a carved meeting house at Waitangi—to be a symbol of the partnership of the two peoples in the one land.
The gains to be made in focusing public attention on Waitangi and the treaty were also recognized by other Maori MPs, affiliated to the religio-political Ratana movement and to the Labour party. Through their efforts, 6 February was to become the national day and a holiday in 1973. This was achieved because the objective accorded with the country's growing aspirations for expressing national identity. The Ratana-Labour MPs' aims went further, however: They wanted the treaty to have statutory recognition (sometimes called "ratification"), since the treaty was said to have no legal standing unless incorporated into domestic law. In 1975 the third Labour government took the first step towards this legislative recognition by passing the Treaty of Waitangi Act, by which the Waitangi Tribunal was established.
|
|
|
|
Waitangi Tribunal
The tribunal is empowered to investigate Maori claims against the Crown respecting infringements of treaty rights through crown action or lack of action. It makes recommendations to the Crown on an appropriate course of redress, if needed. It must "give practical application to the principles of the treaty" by taking into account the meanings of both English and Maori texts. The act makes the tribunal responsible for determining what those principles are. In the early 1980s, under the chairmanship of Chief Judge E. Durie, the tribunal began to release reports that were informative on the treaty and on the country' s history. Of considerable interest to Maori leaders, the reports initially had a limited circulation among Pakeha, but their ideas and main thrust gradually influenced a wider public—members of the public service, the legal profession, the churches, and groups and individuals committed to justice and indigenous rights.
The development of this informed body of public opinion came at a critical time. Maori protests in the 1970s and early 1980s were pitched against an uncomprehending political establishment and played out before a largely incredulous, bemused public. They provided excellent material for media coverage, and the media broadcast it all. A 1975 land march from the far north swelled to 3,000 by the time it carried its banner—"Not one more acre of Maori land"—into Parliament grounds. And in 1978-79, Auckland's Bastion Point was occupied by protestors for more than 500 days before police forced eviction.
But from the late 1970s it was Waitangi Day and Waitangi itself that annually became the focus of increasingly confrontational protest. Protestors branded the government' s commitment to the treaty fraudulent and called on government to honour the treaty and to grapple with the bicultural relationship it founded, before using it as the basis of an idealized multicultural national identity. They called on government to acknowledge openly that Maori had a special status as the country's tangata whenua (indigenous people). Some called for a boycott of the day. Official speakers became more cautious in stressing the often-repeated one people theme. The range of opinion among both Maori and Pakeha was wide, but a substantial body in each camp saw the celebratory character of Waitangi Day as offensive and dismissive of unfinished treaty-related business and was committed to ending the celebration.
A Re-evaluation
The need for fruitful and rational dialogue between Maori and Pakeha communities was urgent. Many were aware of this and conscious that elements of the international scene were impinging on New Zealand affairs—in particular, United Nations activity on human and indigenous rights, the assertiveness of indigenous leaders in nation states newly independent of colonial bonds, and the Afro-American struggle for justice in the United States. For sections of both Maori and Pakeha communities, these events and trends presented a new context for a re-evaluation of government' s dealing with Maori and the treaty.
This re-evaluation came when the fourth Labour government took of fice in July 1984 and pledged to deal with treaty issues. A commitment to introduce legislative recognition where appropriate set in motion a series of events that radically changed the position of the treaty in the nation's life. In 1985 the government extended the powers of the Waitangi Tribunal so that it could investigate grievances dating back to 1840 and made better provision for research to support claims. Ministers and of ficials were required to consider implications for recognizing the treaty's principles in drafting legislative proposals. And government departments and agencies were urged to become more bicultural in their operations and to consult with Maori leaders on significant matters affecting application of the treaty.
The issues involved in all of these moves were complex and baffling to those affected, and only gradually were educative seminars made available. At the same time the Waitangi Tribunal continued to generate reports that had considerable public impact. That the tribunal's work on a claim could affect the whole country and not merely one locality was first evident to the public when a 1986 report resulted in recognition of Maori as an official language and in the establishment of the Maori Language Commission.
In 1986 government aims to re-structure the economy gave urgency to treaty issues. These efforts were bound to conflict with treaty policies sooner or later, and such conflict has been most marked in matters relating to management of land, fisheries, water, and mineral rights. Under the State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) Act 1986, a group of state-owned commercial enterprises was to manage a range of state assets such as land and forests, coal, and electricity services with the aim of eventual privatization. This mandate placed at risk the government's treaty policy of investigating grievances that could be brought only against the Crown. If the Crown shed its assets, they would not be available for possible tribunal recommendations for remedy. Protection was built into the act, including the clause, "Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi."
The extent of protection was in doubt and was tested in a 1987 Court of Appeal case that rendered a landmark decision. The court came to two major conclusions: the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi override everything else in the SOE Act, and those principles require the Pakeha and Maori treaty partners to act towards each other "reasonably and with the utmost good faith." This interpretation of the significance of the treaty's principles supported the work of the tribunal, which had been steadily defining the principles as it was required to do. Above all, the case showed that the duties of the treaty partners—the Crown and the Maori people—could be enforced if necessary by the courts in any legislation that included treaty principles. By 1995 this would affect legislation covering a very wide range of public interests. Judicial interpretation of the treaty is bound to continue to play an important role in public affairs. Between 1987 and 1993, for example, there were at least eleven Court of Appeal decisions on treaty-related matters.
|
Maori and Pakeha
Key Historical Events 1835 - Declaration of Independence of New Zealand by a group of Maori leaders accepted by British government 1840 - Treaty of Waitangi signed 1852 - Constitution Act: New Zealand a self-governing colony—Maori participation excluded in practice 1860 - Government re-affirms treaty promises at conference of Maori leaders 1860s - Control of Maori affairs passes from governor to settler parliament - War to assert sovereignty leads to land confiscation 1865 - Native Land Act establishes court to determine title to Maori lands, ending crown pre-emption and leading to direct settler purchase 1867 - Four Maori members of Parliament allowed but cannot stem loss of Maori land and resources 1870 - Continuing breaches of treaty by land legislation and other measures through l9th and 20th centuries 1877 - Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington: Supreme Court states that treaty is a "simple nullity" 1882 - First of several Maori appeals to the British Crown 1927 - Sim Commission admits crown responsibility for 1860s confiscations and limited compensation paid in 1940s 1941 - Hoani Te Heu Heu Takino v. Aotea District Maori Land Board: Privy Council lays down principle that treaty is unenforceable in courts unless incorporated in statute 1975 - Treaty of Waitangi Act: Tribunal established to investigate claims against Crown arising after 1975 1985 - An amendment expands the tribunal's powers to allow it to make recommendations on claims dating back to 1840 1986 - State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) Act, section 9: nothing in the act to permit the Crown to act in a manner inconsistent with the principles of the treaty; section 27 provides protection for claims currently before the tribunal 1987 - Court of Appeal decision that transfer of crown lands to SOEs without consideration of Maori land grievances would be inconsistent with the treaty's principles and so unlawful in terms of SOE Act 1988 - Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act ensures no present or future claimants are prejudiced through transfer of land to SOEs 1989 - Crown Forest Assets Act provides for transfer of crown forest assets and for protection of Maori claims under Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 - Maori Fisheries Act provides interim settlement; Fisheries Commission set up - Other acts contain provisions requiring that decision makers "have regard to" and/or "take into account" the principles of the treaty 1992 - "Sealord Deal" and Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1994 - Crown proposals for the settlement of treaty claims |
Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit
In the late 1980s, the treaty' s profile remained high as the Labour government continued to pursue its policies of commercialization of crown assets while at the same time dealing with treaty issues. In 1988 the Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit (TOWPU) was established in the Justice Department to advise on the process of negotiated claims settlements. The tribunal was expanded to allow more hearings so that the growing number of claims could be more speedily shifted along. Hearings on major
claims captured media attention, in particular the Ngai Tahu claim, which covered most of the South Island, and the Muriwhenua claim, which involved the far north. Both claims raised issues of treaty guarantees in relation to publicly owned resources.
Decisions on land, forestry, and fishing rights were especially urgent in view of government commercial proposals that would affect them. The Crown Forest Assets Act 1989 answered the immediate concerns of both crown and Maori negotiators about development of commercial forestry and gave protection to the interests of all involved, while deferring a solution of problems.
Fishery rights posed more difficult problems, yet the government was compelled to take action. It was adopting a policy of fishery management based on Individual Transferable Quotas—tradable harvesting rights for certain species—that ignored Maori rights. Convinced by a Law Commission report that indisputable rights existed and that it should make provision for recognizing them, the government passed the Maori Fisheries Act 1989. The Fisheries Act aimed to accommodate Maori rights within an efficient fishing industry structure, but its provision for a transfer of 10% of the commercial fishery to Maori over a four-year period— criticized by both Maori and the fishing industry even as implemented—was an interim solution only.
|
|
|
Tipene O'Regan speaking at Waitangi commemorations at Okains Bay, Banks Peninsula, 1988. |
|
The aim of these proposals is to establish a framework to resolve the historical grievances of the Maori people. Together the proposals form one of the most significant steps in recent years to settle Treaty of Waitangi claims. Hon. D. A. M. Graham |
The "Sealord Deal"
Further fuel for debate was provided in 1992 when crown and Maori negotiators entered into what is commonly called the "Sealord Deal." The Crown financed for Maori a joint-venture acquisition of Sealord Products Ltd. and made provision for the allocation of 20% of all new quota species. In return, Maori agreed to the repeal of legislation that had given some recognition of Maori fishing rights, to the restriction of the tribunal's ability to inquire into commercial fisheries claims, and to the discontinuance of all fisheries litigation against the Crown. The Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 provided the legislative basis, stating that it was "a full and final settlement of all Maori claims to commercial fishing rights." That Maori interests by 1995 control a very substantial portion of the country's fishing industry has created heated debate among Maori on how it is to be used and, more generally, on the wisdom of the government's moves when Maori negotiators did not have a full mandate from Maoridom.
Fishery rights are part of a much wider Maori-Pakeha debate about the treaty and the place of the Maori people in the national life. Discord, although muted on Waitangi days in the late 1980s, was not an impediment to the 1990 sesquicentenary commemoration of the treaty, but the debate was bound to emerge again. The national government took office in late 1990 pledging to redress grievances and to unite the country— a message to Maori claimants and to the wider electorate. It was also to continue policies of economic rationalization. Reconciling such potentially explosive and possibly conflicting aims places the government in a highly vulnerable position. The decision to introduce radical changes in the political arena in 1996, through adopting an electoral system of multi-member proportional representation (MMP), has made the situation even more uncertain.
In 1995 there are many shades of opinion on the treaty in both Maori and non-Maori populations. From the viewpoint of Maori involved in treaty claims, the government's record over the last four to five years has been less than satisfactory. Not that the Waitangi Tribunal is not valued for its bicultural mode of operation and its assessment of redress of grievances: it is.
But its work, though necessarily cautious, seems unduly slow. Its recommendations, by and large, have not brought the hoped-for results, for it has no power to enforce them (a point largely forgotten by its detractors). Nevertheless, the government, to avoid further antagonizing public opinion, assured New Zealanders in a 1993 amendment that the tribunal would not threaten private interests. Impatience has made a number of tribal groups move straight to negotiation. To deal with this business, the Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit was superseded at the end of 1994 by an Of fice of Treaty Settlements (OTS). But whether this negotiation process is preferable and of lasting satisfaction remains to be seen. At least one major claim—that of Waikato—has been concluded in a NZ$170-million deal signed in May 1995.
Rangatiratanga
For the Maori people as a whole, securing adequate economic resources through government processes is crucial to ensuring development. In fact, some say that the focus on treaty grievances distracts them from the major challenge—constructing an effective policy for Maori development. A history of resource loss has combined with urbanization since the 1950s to produce a disproportionate number of Maori at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale. Problems associated with health, education, and crime bedevil many Maori communities. There is some divergence of opinion on how government resources can best be used, but there is a broad consensus on the urgency for adequate allocation and on the need to exercise the rangatiratanga guaranteed in the treaty to ensure that resources are used appropriately.
|
The Crown acknowledges that its representatives and advisers acted unjustly and in breach of the Treaty of Waitangi in its dealings with the Kingitanga and Waikato in sending its forces across the Mangatawhiri in July 1863 and unfairly labelling Waikato as rebels. Part of crown apology in settlement package |
Variously expressed in the 1990s as autonomy, selfdetermination, or sovereignty, rangatiratanga is not easily won. The Runanga Iwi Act of 1989 promised devolution to tribal authorities, but the act was repealed by the national government, which favoured a ministry—Te Puni Kokiri (TPK)—charged with (among other matters) providing policy advice and with monitoring delivery of services through mainstream departments. But TPK lacks power to enforce either acceptance of the advice or delivery of services. Not that it is alone in providing a Maori voice within government. Most departments and ministries developed Maori advice sections in the early l990s, and legislation such as the Resource Management Act 1991 makes provision for Maori to be significant participants in local affairs and resource use.
|
The terms of the Government's Proposals for the settlement of Treaty
of Waitangi Claims give little reason to believe that there has been any
fundamental move awayfrom a colonial mind set and towards a system of laws
and policies which encompass modern New Zealand's unique heritage and
origins. The amount necessary to ensure a just settlement is in fact not known. Estimates vary but even highly conservative estimates suggest that the sum of 1 billion dollars falls well short of a reasonable and fair settlement price. Hui delegates concluded that the approach taken in the Proposal, emphasising political expediency rather thanfairness and justice, is at best irresponsible. Not only is the size of the envelope a source of concern but thefailure to disclose the manner in which the [financial1 cap has been determined suggests a rigidity if not an arrogance which has done little to uphold the principles of honour and good faith. Report on Government proposals, |
A Maori Voice
For years a Maori voice has spoken also in a number of other forums, most notably the government-funded New Zealand Maori Council, the Maori Women' s Welfare League, and a more recently established independent Maori Congress. But there is no representative body to which all tribal groups accord a mandate. Some say that decisions can be made only at tribal level anyway, but others point to the urbanized Maori population— 70-80% of the total Maori population of around 500,000 who claimed Maori ancestry in the 1991 census—for whom tribal ties are either non-existent or not strong. (No tribal affiliation was stated on 144,000 census returns.) If a body did emerge—pan-tribal or pan-Maori—many would say that it could exercise rangatiratanga only if it were independent of government and accountable only to its constituents, and that Maori must decide on a suitable structure.
The issue of Maori sovereignty and what it means was in the fore in Waitangi Day 1995 protests. The word "sovereignty" produces a strong adverse reaction in government circles as well as in the wider public arena. Perhaps this is because claims for Maori sovereignty appear to challenge government authority and to threaten the cohesion of the nation state. And yet sovereignty, or rangatiratanga—if it means for Maori the right to control resources and determine policy thereto—is not unreasonable. A representative body with a widely acknowledged Maori mandate could be advantageous to government for consultation. But if an independent Maori body posed a threat to government authority, then it probably would be unacceptable. And yet a genuine sharing of authority and a partnership role in decision-making is exactly what Maori leaders have been seeking since 1840. The challenge is to find a solution that will satisfy both government and Maori—structures that will accord satisfaction of both the kawanatanga and the rangatiratanga of the treaty.
No Consultation
That is no simple matter, given entrenched attitudes on the one hand and increasing assertiveness on the other. When government released new proposals for treaty settlement in December 1994 these elements came into conflict. The proposals caused intense irritation with Maori at all levels. Among many criticisms several are central to the treaty process: First, that over a threeyear period government had worked on a framework for negotiation and had done so without formal consultation with Maori leadership seemed a disregard for the treaty's partnership relationship. The proposals themselves, though said to be just a framework for negotiation, were setting the terms of that negotiation. And they are a very mixed bag. Limits are laid down on the extent of any settlement—both availability of resources and funding for compensation. The latter—set at one billion dollars—has become known in its Treasury-speak terms as the "fiscal envelope" or "cap." Although perhaps necessary for government policy planners, the crown proposals appear to be an attempt to limit government accountability .
At a series of meetings between February and April 1995, the crown proposals were rejected by both tribal and urban groups. The rejection says as much about the process adopted by government as about the terms offered. Speakers have taken particular issue with the points that any settlement be full and final and that no further claim on it be brought to the courts or the tribunal. How, they asked, could they bind future generations? Moreover, the proposals seem to negate the continuing partnership relationship between the Crown and Maori present in the treaty and explicitly developed in the treaty principles.
Not surprising therefore was the extent of anger and impatience shown on 6 February 1995 at Waitangi, which was followed over subsequent weeks by a number of land occupations around the country. In time there will no doubt be shifting interpretations of these events; however, the immediate impressions seem clear enough. Among a wide spectrum of the Maori people—leaders at national and tribal level, younger people, and urbanized groupings—there is extensive disillusionment with recent government policy trends. As TPK's head, Wira Gardiner, noted, for those with least to lose, protest is a cry for help and a cost-effective mechanism of drawing attention to a grievance. For some sectors it also represents a vote of no confidence in a Maori leadership seen to be enjoying the fruits of success while others are still on the economic battle front.
One People
All this has caused immense media interest and intense private and public debate. Despite a recent small flood of information on the treaty and related issues, the attitudes of New Zealanders at large are predictably varied. Some remain convinced that the treaty is irrelevant to l995 and should be buried in the mists of history. A step away from this is the assertion that there should be equality of all citizens—we are all one people—which usually means no affirmative action regardless of injustices or impediments. Sometimes the fear that "Maori are getting away with something" leads to a cry for one law for all New Zealanders. Many are averse, as they put it, to taxpayers bearing the burden of transgressions of their forefathers.
But there are other positions. Those who admit that things have not always been fairly carried out by past governments are often ready to agree that grievances be settled. But many are impatient to see the job done and no more heard about the treaty. Others have dug deeper into the issues and are working through the implications of finding practical implementation of treaty rights. Important members of this last group are those with knowledge of overseas developments in indigenous rights—especially in Canada and in Australia, where structures and funding to deal with land claims appear to meet Aborigine and Torres Strait Islander hopes for self-determination. Such developments have some relevance to the New Zealand situation, as does a growing jurisprudence on indigenous rights that informs the country's law profession. There is also an awareness that the United Nations' work on a draft declaration on indigenous rights will ultimately affect the local scene. But these matters circulate among a relatively small informed sector of the populace.
Meanwhile, many New Zealanders continue to ask if and when it will all stop. Most probably go on hoping that treatyrelated problems will just subside. Hard to grasp is the fact that New Zealanders are, as one commentator has said, "finally beginning the long and necessary process of decolonizing ourselves from within." No such process happens without talking through issues, and such talk brings conflict. The fear that such conflict will irreparably corrode the fabric of social cohesion might well lead to that very end if Maori and government leaders talk past each other.
Claudia Orange is a specialist in New Zealand history and has written
extensively on the Treaty of Waitangi. She is currently General Editor of the Dictionary
of New Zealand Biography. 