 | |
| The late Joe Charlo speaking to the BHP Environmental Assessment Panel, Dettah | |
| |
| The late Joe Charlo speaking to the BHP Environmental Assessment Panel, Dettah | |
1. Introduction
Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd. (BHP) has proposed to develop and operate a diamond mine in the Slave Geological Province (SGP) in the Northwest Territories. Its project is presently undergoing an environmental assessment. That review is flawed in fundamental ways. But, before discussing these issues, some background information is helpful.
Significant mineral development in the Slave Geological Province north of Yellowknife is likely in the next few years. The scale and pace of development will be determined by the size and grade of ore deposits, the world price of minerals, and the cost of extracting and transporting them to market. Diamonds, gold and other precious metals, and base metals have been found, some as "world class" deposits.
In 1994, the Government of the Northwest Territories recommended that the federal government "invest" $650 million to provide infrastructure in the region-an all-weather road from Yellowknife to Coppermine and a port on the Arctic coast. The NWT Power Corporation identified potential hydropower sites on the region's rivers that could be developed. It has been estimated that mining could contribute nearly $20 billion to national Gross Domestic Product.
BHP Diamonds Inc. has moved rapidly to develop its Lac de Gras diamond property 250 km northeast of Yellowknife, and Kennecott Canada is poised to follow suit on its diamond property just to the south. BHP' s proposal is subject to the 1984 Environmental Assessment and Review Guidelines Order. Subsequent mines will be subject to screening and review under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.
When evaluating the future of the Slave Geological Province it is crucial to appreciate that
2. The BHP Review
Following screening of the proposed project by the Yellowknifebased Regional Environmental Review Committee, the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development referred the project in summer 1994 to the Minister of Environment for a public review by an environmental assessment panel. A four-person panel review of the proposed development was announced in December 1994. Public meetings were held in winter 1994- 1995 to "scope" the nature of the assessment. Environmental impact statement (EIS) guidelines were issued by the panel to the proponent on 23 May 1995 and the proponent presented its EIS to the panel on 24 July 1995. Public hearings on the EIS were held in January and February 1996. The panel submitted its report and recommendations to ministers in June 1996.
When announcing the review, Minister Copps noted it would be conducted "in the spirit of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act," which came into effect a scant six weeks later. This was taken to mean that cumulative effects assessment and sustainable development principles would feature significantly in the environmental assessment. Simultaneously, Ron Irwin, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, announced a five-year environmental baseline study-the West Kitikmeot-Slave Study-to develop information to assess regional and cumulative effects of large-scale mineral development in the region, including but not limited to the BHP project.
Several important issues loom
large in the BHP review.
2.1 Purpose of the Environmental Review
An environmental review, by pursuing standards of comprehensiveness, rigour, and fairness, is intended to give ministers impartial advice on whether a project should proceed, and if so, under what conditions. It is our position that the review of the BHP project has not been comprehensive, rigorous, or fair.
BHP' s project is complex and technical. It therefore follows that the review should deal carefully with technical issues, seeking to understand the implications and impacts of the proposed development in order to recommend mitigative measures. In the course of the hearings, the panel chairperson stated, "I would also like to stress that this is not a technical review per se." Furthermore, the panel did not retain legal or technical experts to help it frame its own interests, raise questions, or assist others to explore technical issues. Perhaps the panel expected government agencies to come forward with sound technical analyses of the proposal. Some did, notably the Department of Renewable Resources, GNWT. Others did little to advance the technical investigation. Some departments were absent from the proceedings, hardly in keeping with the panel' s request for information from all relevant and involved agencies.
CARC is deeply concerned about the quality of the review. If the BHP review was not intended to examine technical aspects of the project, under whose auspices and when will such a review take place?
2.2 Funding
We understand that the Government of Canada planned to provide the panel with $250,000 to conduct the assessment, and that a further $250,000 was available to assist intervenors. This level of funding was wholly insufficient, which explains, in part, the severe time constraints placed upon intervenors in both the community and Yellowknife hearings. The participant funding committee made some very poor decisions. For example, the community of Lutsel K'e received only $6,000 and the Dene Nation, nothing at all. [Authors' note: The final figure for the BHP panel has been estimated at $900,000, well over the initial budget. The panel must have been under intense pressure to conclude the review and limit further expenditures.]
We note by comparison that other project reviews, some of much less technical complexity, received more funding. The Labrador-Quebec Low Level Flying Panel received in excess of $2 million, while the Pearson International Airport Expansion panel received just over $1 million. The Great Whale project received just under $4 million. The Northern Diseased
Bison review-scarcely the revenue-generating project that the BHP project is-was given just over $500,000.
In light of the difficult fiscal climate facing the federal government, it is worth comparing the cost to government of the review with likely revenues to be generated by the project. DIAND' s submission to the panel estimated that royalty and taxation revenues to the federal government over the expected 25-year life of the mine would amount to $2.1 billion. This estimate is based on current taxation and royalty rates, both of which are under review and likely to be increased. With the prospect of such a large economic impact on the national and regional economies, and significantly enhanced revenue flows to government, the decision to under-fund this review makes little sense.
2.3 Scope of the Assessment
The terms of reference to the panel and the panel's Draft EIS Guidelines were encouraging. Both referred to regional perspectives, traditional knowledge, and cumulative impact analysis as important building blocks for an effective assessment. Unfortunately, the final guidelines did not fully reflect the representations for improvement that many intervenors suggested. The regional view gave way to a much narrower single projectlclaims block view. Resources and time to do good traditional knowledge research were not available. Attempts to take account of cumulative effects fell far short of expectations. The West Kitikmeot-Slave Study, now two years into its mandate, has only in the past couple of months commissioned its first research projects. What should have been a comprehensive regional assessment now stands as a very limited analysis of a single project with reference neither to the potential for significantly greater development nor to long-term cumulative effects.
2.4 Speed of the Review
Industry and the territorial government complained of delays in setting up the review panel after the project was referred to the Minister of Environment, a chronic complaint we note from past reviews. The current complaint seems justified. Once established, however, the panel proceeded at a brisk pace. The EIS was available to the public in mid-summer 1995, giving intervenors five months to digest the documents and build their cases. The lack of adequate funding compounded the difficulty in meeting deadlines. This was all the more critical for those aboriginal residents of the affected area whose first language is not English.
BHP's project is complex and technical. It therefore follows that the review should deal carefully with technical issues, seeking to understand the implications and impacts of the proposed development in order to recommend mitigative measures. In the course of the hearings, the panel chairperson stated, "I would also like to stress that this is not a technical review per se."
2.5 Procedures
The combined effect of problems with the scope of the review, its essential purpose, under-funding, and the haste with which the panel proceeded set the scene for serious procedural deficiencies. Three types of hearings were scheduled: I) Community Hearings; 2) General Sessions - Yellowknife; 3) Technical Sessions - Yellowknife.
Community hearings lasted for part of a day in each of the affected communities. In some cases, discussion went late into the night to keep to the next day's schedule. It should be remembered that community hearings are an opportunity for all people there who wish to be heard. When the panel chairperson asked for people in the communities to come forward with only those views and information not already discussed, the communities were offended.
In the Yellowknife hearings, time restrictions were adopted by the panel, again to keep to a pre-ordained schedule. More specifically,
- the panel did not provide sufficient time for intervenors to question the proponent or other presenters;
- the panel varied the questioning procedures during the hearing, which resulted in uneven opportunities to ask questions.
These time restrictions call into question the value received from intervenor funding. It is fair to ask at this point whether these funds were "wasted" since so little time was available for intervenors and experts to present the information they had prepared. Since the members of the panel are not themselves technical experts, and since the panel did not have technical advisors, it cannot claim that it can rely on the briefs that were submitted.
Time restrictions clearly diminished the opportunity for people to express their views fully and, therefore, for the panel to be informed fully. These restrictions had a particular and negative impact on CARC, Ecology North, World Wildlife Fund Canada, and the Canadian Nature Federation, the members of the Northern Environmental Coalition (NEC), who brought to the hearings numerous experts to present technical information and to question the proponent. The NEC was one of very few intervenors to bring forward such experts.
Traditional knowledge research findings were limited to an overview of the literature, interviews with some of BHP's own aboriginal employees, and preliminary issues identified by aboriginal organizations. In fairness to the proponent, it was not something it alone should have been asked to do. Documentation of traditional knowledge must be done by aboriginal communities.
2.6 Traditional Knowledge
Although the panel' s guidelines called for "full and equal consideration" for traditional knowledge, aboriginal participants, government of ficials, environmental groups, and CARC agreed that the EIS failed to meet this requirement. Traditional knowledge research findings were limited to an overview of the literature, interviews with some of BHP's own aboriginal employees, and preliminary issues identified by aboriginal organizations. In fairness to the proponent, it was not something it alone should have been asked to do. Documentation of traditional knowledge must be done by aboriginal communities.
2.7 Late Information
The proponent submitted its EIS only two months after receiving the EIS Guidelines. This remarkable achievement was at a cost-the EIS did not include data from the 1995 field season. To the surprise and consternation of many intervenors, the panel allowed the proponent to submit this information (essentially appendices to the EIS) in December 1995 but did not alter its hearings scheduled to begin in January 1996. Intervenors had only days to analyze the new data before the hearings commenced. This was improper and unfair.
2.8 Conclusion
CARC believes firmly that three principles-comprehensiveness, fairness, and rigour-should underlie all environmental assessments. We conclude that the BHP assessment failed to live up to these principles. The advice it will give can therefore only be partial, untested in parts, and not fully representative of the legitimate interests that appeared before the panel.
The costs to governments in
proceeding before making a fuller evaluation of all relevant matters
could be very great. We respectfully urge you Mr. Minister to
proceed with caution and to take the time needed to consult widely
and deeply so that the deficiencies noted above, and any others
that appear once the panel report is released, can be rectified.